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FOREWORD

The accounting profession, the financial community, government reg
ulatory bodies, and the general public all have a vital interest in the
quality of performance of independent public accountants. This report
is a part of the efforts of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) to inform those publics of the accounting profes
sion’s programs to safeguard the public interest in the work of CPAs
and to assure a continuing commitment to quality performance by CPAs.
The report is the product of the SECPS Review Committee, a special
committee formed in 1983 to review the structure, operations, and
effectiveness of the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of the AICPA Division
for CPA Firms. It is more than an evaluation of that program: It is a
positive and understandable description of what the program is and how
it fits into the overall scheme of public and private regulation, as well as
a positive reinforcement of a highly successful program to improve the
quality of audit practice before the Securities and Exchange Commission
and to safeguard the public interest in the financial reporting process.
It complements a similar review and evaluation of the Private Companies
Practice Section (PCPS) of the Division for CPA Firms completed earlier
by another Institute special committee, the PCPS Structure Committee.
A profession must be constantly vigilant to improve its performance
and to retain public trust. In the October 1978 edition of Harpers, the
noted scholar and writer Jacques Barzun observed that: “a profession is
by nature a vulnerable institution. It makes claims; it demands unique
privileges; and it has to perform.” This report chronicles and evaluates
one aspect of that performance by the accounting profession, the SEC
Practice Section of the Division for CPA Firms. The overall evaluation
is that the structure of the section is sound and its major programs are
effective. But the report recommends some significant changes to improve
both the operations and the public understanding of the section.
The SECPS executive committee has accepted the report’s recommen
dations and, as indicated in the letter from the chairman of that committee
in Appendix C, has begun to implement them. The board of directors
believes this will strengthen an already strong and viable program. But,
perhaps even more important, the improved awareness and understand
ing of the program that should result from these efforts will enhance
V

both public acceptance of the work of CPAs and public confidence in
that work.
We commend the members of the SECPS review committee for their
dedication and industry in this worthwhile effort. All of the members of
the committee, including two from outside of the accounting profession,
have had a long history of service to the profession. Under the able
leadership of Michael N. Chetkovich, the chairman of the Institute in
1977 when the Division of CPA Firms was established, the committee
has made a valuable contribution to the Institute, to the profession, and
to the public. We appreciate their effort and the timely and efficient
manner in which it was performed.
Bernard Z. Lee
Chairman of the Board
Philip B. Chenok
President
New York
October 1984
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INTRODUCTION

In February 1983, Rholan E. Larson, then the chairman of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA, or the Institute),
appointed a special committee to review the structure, operations, and
effectiveness of the SEC practice section (SECPS, or the section) of the
AICPA Division for CPA Firms. The committee was given the charge to
review and evaluate the activities of the SECPS since its formation in
light of the section’s goal to improve the quality of practice before the
Securities and Exchange Commission—including the activities of its
executive, peer review, and special investigations committees, the role of
the Public Oversight Board in the process, and the section’s objectives,
membership requirements, organizational structure, and functions—and
to report its findings to the AICPA Board of Directors.
The members of the committee, including two individuals from outside
the accounting profession, are:
Michael N. Chetkovich, Chairman
George R. Catlett
J. Michael Cook
Gerald W. Hepp
Richard S. Hickok

William S. Kanaga
Thomas C. Pryor
Abraham M. Stanger
Marvin L. Stone

All of the CPAs on the committee have been actively involved in the
Institute, serving or having served on its governing bodies, on senior
committees, or in other capacities. Three members are past chairmen of
the Institute: Michael N. Chetkovich (1976—77), former managing part
ner of Deloitte Haskins & Sells; William S. Kanaga (1980—81), managing
partner of Arthur Young 8c Company; and Marvin L. Stone (1967—68),
a consultant, who until recently was a senior partner of Coopers &
Lybrand. The professional affiliation of other CPAs on the committee
are George R. Catlett, retired senior partner, Arthur Andersen &: Co.;
J. Michael Cook, managing partner-designate, Deloitte Haskins 8c Sells;
Gerald W. Hepp, senior partner, Plante 8c Moran; and Richard S. Hickok,
chairman emeritus of Main Hurdman/KMG. The two members from
outside the profession are Thomas C. Pryor, senior vice president,
Jennison Associates, investment managers, and a member of the Insti
tute’s Board of Directors since 1978; and Abraham M. Stanger, member
1

of the New York City law firm of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson
and adjunct professor of law, New York University.
The Division for CPA Firms, established in 1977, represented a bold
and unique approach to professional self-regulation and one for which
there still is no counterpart outside the public accounting profession.
After over six years of experience with the division, an evaluation is
desirable to determine whether the SECPS has been responsive to its
purpose, whether it remains sufficiently relevant in today’s environment,
and what changes should be made to enhance its effectiveness. This
report is the result of that review. It was completed and submitted to
the AICPA Board of Directors in June of 1984.
The remainder of this report consists of six chapters and three
appendixes. Chapter 2 is an overview that summarizes the principal
findings and describes the review process. Chapter 3 is a discussion of
self-regulation to provide the context and a framework for an under
standing of the review and evaluation process and the conclusions.
Chapter 4 presents background information on the SECPS. Chapter 5
presents the results of the review and evaluation; it contains the com
mittee’s conclusions, suggestions, and specific recommendations (high
lighted in boldfaced type) and the underlying rationale. Chapter 6 is a
summation. Appendix A contains a description of the components and
programs of the section and a discussion of their activities to date.
Appendix B is a reprint of the article, “Self-Regulation—Perils and
Problems,” by Robert K. Mautz, from the May 1983Journal of Accountancy.
Appendix C is the response to the conclusions and recommendations of
the report from the chairman of the SECPS Executive Committee.

chapter 2

OVERVIEW

The SEC Practice Section of the Division for CPA Firms is significant in
the overall structure of self-regulation in the accounting profession, but
it is only a part of that structure. In this report, we review and evaluate
the section in terms of its effectiveness in the broad context of self
regulation and present our recommendations for changes and initiatives
designed to enhance its effectiveness.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

The SECPS, which has as its primary objective the maintenance of high
standards of performance in the accounting and audit practice of CPA
firms before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), is only one
of several closely interrelated segments of the profession’s overall struc
ture for self-regulation. The objectives of self-regulation are achieved
primarily through the voluntary compliance of members of the profession
with established standards and rules and through their cooperation in
taking remedial or corrective actions when deficiencies are noted. A
proper understanding of the basic nature of self-regulation, of its scope
and objectives, of how it differs from public regulation, as well as of the
interrelationships among its various elements is critical to an evaluation
of the section’s performance.
Our overall evaluation is that the structure of the section is sound and
that it is carrying out its major programs in an effective manner. The
dedication shown by members of the profession who have taken an
active part in the administration and operations of the section—partic
ularly those who have served on its executive, peer review, and special
investigations committees—and their contributions of time and effort
are commendable.
Although our overall evaluation is favorable, we see the need for some
significant changes and improvements. Accordingly, we recommend in
this report a number of ways in which the program might be improved.
While the level and composition of membership in the section is
reasonable for a voluntary organization, efforts to attract as members all
firms with SEC clients should continue. We see a real need to develop
an effective public information program, one that will make the section’s
objectives and accomplishments better known to, and better understood

by, various interested audiences. Accordingly, we recommend that the
section develop a broad-based public information program, including,
but not limited to, the issuance of periodic reports on the scope and
results of its activities.
The Public Oversight Board (POB, or board), both in concept and in
performance, has strengthened the structure and effectiveness of the
section. It has performed commendably in reporting on and explaining
the system to the public and in suggesting improvements. The stature
and credibility of the board have contributed significantly to the viability
of the section and are critical to public acceptance of the profession’s
program of self-regulation.
The executive committee has met its responsibility to direct the program
and has made changes as necessary to meet the needs of the public and
the profession. The present size and composition of the committee and
the procedures for selecting its members appear to be satisfactory;
however, we recommend that firms represented on the committee make
a greater effort to select as representatives individuals who can speak
authoritatively for their firms and who will attend meetings regularly.
We also recommend initiatives that the committee might take to—
•

Improve communications among the components of the section
and with other groups.
• Clarify the conditions under which it would impose sanctions.
• Develop new programs to enhance the benefits of membership.
The peer review program, the major undertaking of the section, is
basically sound and is functioning effectively. It has been beneficial to
member firms and to the public in helping to assure and enhance the
quality of the accounting and audit practice of member firms. We concur
with the section’s recent decision that litigation involving a firm should
be considered in determining the scope of a peer review. We believe
that the requirement for member firms to undergo peer reviews every
three years continues to be appropriate, and we do not see the need at
this time for any other fundamental changes in the peer review process.
In terms of actions that should be taken, we recommend that the section
adopt more specific requirements relating to the evaluation in peer
reviews of the effectiveness of a firm’s second-partner review program.
The investigative process complements the peer review program and
has operated effectively within the established guidelines for its activities.
While the special investigations committee has performed a difficult
assignment in a creditable manner, actions can be taken to enhance its
effectiveness and acceptance. We recommend that steps be taken to—
• Clarify the scope of its authority and its mode of operation.
• Disseminate more information about its activities.
• Expand the scope of the cases that member firms are required
to report.
• Achieve more equitable and consistent treatment of the cost of
special peer reviews.

A standing coordinating committee should be established to facilitate
and encourage greater coordination between the two sections of the
AICPA Division for CPA Firms.
THE REVIEW PROCESS

The review encompassed the circumstances that led to the formation of
the section and its objectives, organizational structure, programs, oper
ations, and achievements. We considered the views of selected leaders
of the profession, including the current and past chairmen of the major
committees of the section, the membership of the section, the POB,
representatives of the SEC and of the U.S. General Accounting Office,
and others.
We met with various individuals and groups to discuss the areas of
interest and concern. Representatives of the major committees of the
section discussed with us their views on the operations of the section,
responded to our questions, and provided us with background infor
mation on the activities of the section. Members of the SEC staff,
including the Chief Accountant, gave us the benefit of their views on
the effectiveness of the program and on issues confronting the section.
The POB discussed with us their procedures, conclusions, and recom
mendations. The chairman of our committee and senior AICPA staff
met with the chairman of the SEC and the Comptroller General of the
United States to obtain their views and suggestions. Individual committee
members had similar meetings with other persons interested in the work
of the section. A representative number of SECPS member firms
submitted their views and comments to us in writing in response to our
communication to each member firm describing our charge and asking
for the firm’s views and comments on matters of concern to it. The
comments received were candid and constructive. They provided useful
insights for our deliberations.
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SELF-REGUUTION IN THE
ACCOUNTING PROFESSION

The SECPS is one of the significant elements of the profession’s overall
program of self-regulation. Therefore, an understanding of self-regu
lation and of what it is expected to accomplish is essential to an evaluation
of the SECPS.

DEFINITION AND FOCUS

Self-regulation, as the term is used in this report, comprehends all of
the standards of skill and competence for entering and continuing in
the accounting profession. It comprehends standards relating to require
ments for continuing professional education as well as technical, ethical,
and quality control standards and the related compliance and disciplinary
procedures that apply to CPAs and CPA firms as a result of their
voluntary memberships in professional organizations, primarily the
AICPA and its components. In this report, the primary focus is on the
SECPS’s program to maintain and enhance the quality of accounting
and audit practice in CPA firms by monitoring and enforcing compliance
with established quality control standards and the membership require
ments of the section.
CPA firms individually also have a significant role in self-regulation.
They perform that role through their intra-firm procedures for compli
ance with professional standards in their practices and through their
actions with regard to individuals who fail to comply with professional
and firm standards and with other standards required of professionals.
The internal quality control procedures of CPA firms, such as their
inspection programs, contribute to the effectiveness of compliance pro
grams conducted through professional organizations, particularly as they
relate to individuals, and constitute an important element of professional
self-regulation.

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

In discussing self-regulation and its relationship to public regulation,
Professor Robert K. Mautz, a member of the POB, pointed out that
Unrealistic expectations arise because critics of the self-regulatory process—
and even some o f the participants—fail to recognize that—
• Self-regulation is unavoidably limited in scope, operating within the
constraints imposed by an already existing and rigorous disciplinary
system.
• Any regulatory activity, and self-regulation in particular, requires a
difficult balancing o f private right and public good.
• Self-regulation differs from public regulation in motivation, method
and purpose.1

In commenting on the scope and objectives of self-regulation, Rholan
E. Larson, writing as AICPA chairman, noted that
Some critics, both within and outside the profession, maintain that the
accounting profession hasn’t achieved the objective o f self-regulation because
it hasn’t publicly sanctioned firms when audit failures have been alleged.2

He went on to discuss the objectives of self-regulation and stressed that
The real objective of the profession’s self-regulatory program is improve
ment in the quality o f practice. The program must create an environment
whereby firms understand what is necessary for quality practice, implement
appropriate policies and procedures, subject their compliance with their
policies and procedures to independent peer review and, most important,
take corrective action when needed.3

Self-regulation encompasses all of the standards and enforcement
procedures established and maintained by a profession to promote a
high quality of performance. The Commission on Auditors’ Responsi
bilities noted that the overall effectiveness of self-regulation depends on
the satisfactory performance of all of its elements operating and inter
acting as a system.4 The commission identified the four elements of such
a system:
1.
2.

Establishing high standards o f skill and competence both for entering
the profession and for continuing the right to practice.
Developing and promulgating technical and ethical standards that serve
both as performance goals and as means o f measuring departures.

1. Robert K. Mautz, “Self-Regulation—Perils and Problems,”J ournal of Accountancy
(May 1983), pp. 76-84. (The article is included in this report as Appendix B.)
2. Rholan E. Larson, “Self-Regulation: A Professional Step Forward,” Journal of
Accountancy (September 1983), pp. 58-64.
3. Ibid., p. 60.
4. The Commission on Auditors’Responsibilities: Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations
(New York: Commission of Auditor’s Responsibilities, 1978).
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3.

Designing and implementing quality control policies and procedures to
monitor and encourage compliance with the technical and ethical
standards.
4 . An effective disciplinary system to impose penalties for performance
or conduct that departs from standards established by law, SEC regu
lation, or the profession.5

The Mautz article previously cited points out that self-regulation and
public regulation of public accountants share a broad objective: to benefit
the financial community while not unnecessarily restricting personal
freedom. An effective system of self-regulation creates an environment
that results in participants seeking and achieving constant improvement
in the quality of practice within their profession.
Viewed realistically, self-regulation is but one element in a complex system
of controls. Society entrusts to a self-regulating profession a limited set of
privileges, among them the right and responsibility to develop, establish,
review and refine standards o f professional performance. Society does so
at least partly because it believes the technical expertise and situational
understanding of members o f the profession qualify them to perform that
role effectively. There is no reason, nor has accounting the ability, to
challenge the other participants in the total regulatory structure. If ac
countants perform their role satisfactorily, the tasks of others will all be
eased. Accountants have a small niche in the total regulatory process but
an important one.6

The article (Appendix B of this report) discusses the important differ
ences between self-regulation and public regulation and notes the
significant challenges confronting self-regulation.
Self-regulation cannot be meaningfully evaluated in isolation from
public regulation. The state boards that administer accountancy statutes,
the SEC with its statutory responsibility to protect the public interest,
the courts with their role in adjudicating disputes and meting out
punishment—all of these play important roles in regulating the profes
sion.
On the relationships among the various elements of regulation, the
report of the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities stated that
Quality control is only one means o f monitoring professional practice. State
boards o f accountancy, the profession, the courts, and the SEC impose
sanctions on individuals or firms for performance or conduct that violates
professional standards or civil or criminal laws.7

5. Ibid., p. 141.
6. Mautz, “Self-Regulation—Perils and Problems,” p. 77. Also, in “Self-Regulation—
Criticism and Response,” Journal of Accountancy (April 1984), Professor Mautz
responds to some of the criticisms that have been made of self-regulation, with
particular emphasis on criticisms of the SECPS.
7. Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities Report, p. 147.

In discussing penalties and the effects of litigation and enforcement
proceedings, the report noted that
Penalties imposed by courts and the SEC overshadow professional selfdiscipline as means of ensuring adequate performance and professional
conduct, and they are probably the most effective purely disciplinary means
o f protecting the public against substandard auditor performance.8

The success of self-regulation in the accounting profession depends,
to a considerable extent, on mutual trust and cooperation among peers—
fellow practitioners who share the same professional responsibilities. The
peer review program of the SECPS, the centerpiece of the system of
self-regulation for CPA firms, is an excellent illustration of the involve
ment of peers in self-regulation.
ROLE OF SANCTIONS

An understanding of the role of sanctions—that is, of how penalties and
punishment are used in a system of self-regulation—is essential to an
evaluation of the role and effectiveness of the SECPS. The term
“sanctions,” as used by the drafters of the organizational document of
the SECPS, encompasses actions to censure, suspend, or expel a member.
In practice, the inherent characteristics of self-regulation, so clearly set
forth by Robert Mautz (see Appendix B) have led the section in a
direction more corrective than punitive in nature.
Actions taken against firms during the initial six-year period of
operation of the SECPS, which have had the effect but not the form of
sanctions, have required member firms to remedy or correct past
deficiencies in order to avoid the recurrence of such problems in the
future. Such actions have been costly to those firms in terms of expend
iture of time and money. Thus, the section has used the threat of
sanctions to assure the cooperation of its members in abiding by its
membership requirements, in taking remedial or corrective actions when
required, and, ultimately, in accomplishing its objective of improving the
quality of practice.
Under the SECPS’s organizational document, the authority to formally
impose sanctions—primarily to censure, suspend, or expel—is reserved
to its executive committee. That committee has carefully defined the
process for the formal imposition of sanctions. However, the section’s
peer review and special investigations committees have the authority to
require firms to take remedial or corrective actions when deficiencies in
a member firm’s quality-control system are found in the peer review and
investigative processes. Those committees also can recommend that the
executive committee impose sanctions if a member firm refuses to
cooperate in taking the required actions. Follow-up procedures, such as
an early revisit by peer reviewers, an accelerated peer review (a repeat
peer review in one or two years rather than the normal three years), or
8. Ibid., p. 151.
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a special extended review in a particular area are measures that have
been employed to assure that member firms take the actions recom
mended by the committees.
Within the context of the section’s original purpose and objectives,
costs of such actions have the effect, though not the form, of a sanction.
Further, the remedial or corrective actions taken by member firms found
to have deficiencies have involved dealing with firms’ partners and
professional staff whose performance contributed to the deficiencies—
including actions such as reassignments, significant additional training
and education, restrictions as to the type of work they perform, and
dismissals.
The authority residing in the executive committee to formally impose
sanctions is effective in assuring that member firms cooperate with the
committees of the section, take remedial or corrective actions when
necessary, and abide by the section’s membership requirements. The
executive committee may also use its formal procedures to sanction a
member firm for an egregious act for which corrective action is an
inadequate response.
The executive committee has not yet used such procedures to censure,
suspend, or expel a member firm. To date, member firms have taken
appropriate remedial or corrective actions in response to findings in the
peer review program and the investigative process.
During the period under review, there have been a number of wellpublicized cases of alleged audit failure. Those cases have been the
subject of court and regulatory actions, with the concomitants of legal
authority and the checks and balances of “due process” clearly set forth
in the American system of justice. Courts and regulatory agencies, with
their power to subpoena documents and to require testimony under
oath, are in the best position to ascertain the facts while observing due
process to protect the rights of parties and to determine blame and assess
penalties.
The SECPS cannot and should not take actions in an individual case
that supplant the established legal procedures developed to serve the
public and protect the rights of persons accused or suspected of wrong
doing. Among the inherent risks of substituting the judgment of the
SECPS for that of duly constituted authorities is the substantial prejudice
to persons that may result from conclusions on a matter under active
consideration by such authorities.
The SECPS, through its special investigations committee, can and does
make various types of investigations of firms involved in alleged audit
failures, as discussed later in this report. However, the emphasis of the
SECPS in such investigations, as well as in its peer review program and
its membership requirements, is to encourage and aid member firms in
a timely manner to improve quality control systems with the objective of
doing everything feasible to reduce the possibility of audit failure. The
authority to impose sanctions helps to assure the cooperation of member
firms in that effort. In our view, that is the most effective way for a
voluntary organization in the private sector to fulfill its self-regulatory
role.

11

chapter 4

BACKGROUND

The AICPA Division for CPA Firms, formed in 1977, consists of two
autonomous and largely independent sections, the SECPS (SEC Practice
Section) and the PCPS (Private Companies Practice Section). The primary
objective of the SECPS is to improve the quality of practice by CPA firms
before the SEC; the activities of the PCPS are directed primarily toward
improving the quality of the auditing and accounting services provided
by CPA firms to private organizations. Any CPA firm may join either or
both sections without regard to whether the firm practices before the
SEC. A review of the structure and functions of the SECPS and the role
of SEC provides background for our findings. Appendix A contains a
detailed discussion of the subject and a review of the section’s activities
since its formation.

PRESENT SECPS STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTIONS

The Division for CPA Firms and the SECPS were created to provide a
structure within the AICPA for regulation of CPA firms, in contrast to
individual CPAs, as a result of challenges facing the profession in the
1970s. Membership in the AICPA, the mechanism for the programs of
self-regulation then in existence, was—and still is—on an individual basis,
and so there was no role in the AICPA for CPA firms as such. The
formation of the division by action of council established a voluntary
membership organization within the structure of the Institute for CPA
firms, with designated membership requirements and authority to initiate
a program of self-regulation for CPA firms.
Thus, the SECPS provides the organizational structure and processes
for the self-regulation of firms with SEC audit practices. It monitors and
enforces compliance with quality control standards through periodic
peer reviews, establishes and enforces membership requirements, re
sponds to the implications of alleged audit failures while litigation is still
in process, and provides through the POB a mechanism for oversight,
which explicitly recognizes and reflects the public interest in reliable
financial reporting. The system is based primarily on voluntary compli
ance, cooperation, and remedial action.
13

The functions of the section are conducted through three major
committees: the executive committee, the peer review committee, and
the special investigations committee. Under the supervision of the AICPA
vice president-technical, the AICPA provides staff support for all of the
activities of the section. The five-member POB, formed in 1978, provides
public oversight of the activities of the section. Those entities are described
briefly in the paragraphs that follow.
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD

The POB was established to represent the public interest by providing
continuing independent overview of the section’s activities. It consists of
five individuals of recognized integrity and high reputation and is
structured so as to assure independence. It has the authority to appoint,
remove, and set the terms of compensation of its members and to select
its chairman; the only limitation on its authority is that appointment of
its members must have the concurrence of the AICPA Board of Directors.
The SECPS has no authority over the POB.
John J. McCloy, who served with distinction as chairman of the board
since its inception, resigned from the board in 1984 for personal reasons.
The current chairman, Arthur M. Wood, and one member, John D.
Harper, have served on the board since its inception. More recent
appointments are Robert K. Mautz, named in 1981, and A. A. Sommer,
Jr., a former SEC commissioner, appointed in 1983. Richard A. Stark
serves as the board’s legal counsel. The board has a permanent staff of
six (four professional and two administrative) headed by Louis W.
Matusiak, the executive director and secretary. Retired partners of CPA
firms have also served as part-time supplemental staff.
The board monitors all of the activities of the SECPS, with special
emphasis on the effectiveness of the peer review program and the special
investigations process. It also recommends to the executive committee,
whenever it sees fit, improvements in the section’s membership require
ments, standards, policies, and procedures. It publishes an annual report
on its evaluation of the activities of the section and has the authority to
issue other reports as it deems appropriate.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The section is governed by an executive committee, composed of
representatives from twenty-one member firms, that has the status of a
senior committee of the AICPA. The executive committee establishes
general policies for the section and has the authority to amend its
membership requirements, to establish budgets and dues to finance the
operations of the section, to deal with complaints against members, to
impose sanctions on member firms, to appoint committees and task
forces, to interact with other AICPA boards and committees, and to
consult with the POB.
PEER REVIEW PROGRAM

The most demanding requirement of membership in the section is that
each member firm undergo a peer review of its accounting and audit
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practice every three years. The peer review committee, consisting of
fifteen members appointed by the executive committee, establishes
standards for peer reviews, administers the peer review program, and
reviews each report. Staff support is received from the AICPA Quality
Control Review Division.
From the inception of the peer review program to December 31, 1983,
510 peer reviews, including initial and subsequent reviews, had been
completed. Those reviews resulted in 433 unqualified reports (360 of
which were accompanied by letters of comment suggesting improvements
to reviewed firms’ quality-control systems), 64 modified reports (reports
with qualified opinions), and 13 adverse reports (reports expressing
negative opinions). Additional requirements, such as revisits by peer
reviewers or accelerated peer reviews, were deemed necessary by the
peer review committee in 72 instances and, in each instance, were agreed
to by the firms involved.
INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS

The special investigations committee responds to concerns raised by
alleged audit failures. The committee was established by the executive
committee in November 1979 in recognition of the significant public
interest in matters concerning the practice of public accounting that have
a bearing on the reliability of financial statements of SEC registrants.
The functions assigned to the special investigations committee are the
following.
1. Assist in providing reasonable assurance to the public and to
the profession that member firms are complying with profes
sional standards in the conduct of their practice before the
Securities and Exchange Commission by identifying corrective
measures, if any, that should be taken by a member firm involved
in a specific alleged audit failure.
2. Assist in improving the quality of practice by member firms
before the Securities and Exchange Commission by determining
whether facts relating to specific alleged audit failures indicate
that changes in generally accepted auditing standards or quality
control standards need to be considered.
3. Recommend to the executive committee, when deemed neces
sary, appropriate sanctions with respect to the member firms
involved.
Member firms are required to report promptly to the special investi
gations committee certain litigation, proceedings, or investigations in
volving the firm or its personnel. Generally speaking, reportable cases
are those alleging audit deficiencies in connection with filings made by
a firm’s SEC clients under the federal securities laws.
The committee conducts its activities in four modes described as
screening, monitoring, investigating a firm, and investigating a case—all
on a confidential basis. However, in keeping with its oversight and public
reporting roles, the Public Oversight Board has complete access to the
process.
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Through December 31, 1983, the committee had placed eighty-two
cases on its agenda, of which sixty-five had been closed. Of the seventeen
active cases, twelve were being screened, current developments in three
were being monitored, and two were open pending the completion of
an investigation of the firm.9 Of the closed cases, three involved inves
tigations of firms.
The special investigations committee has identified the need for
corrective action by firms involved in reported cases in all three of the
activity modes in which it has operated to date (screening, monitoring,
and investigating a firm) and, in each instance, the firm involved has
responded by taking action to correct indicated deficiencies.
MEMBERSHIP AND MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS

Any CPA firm that agrees to abide by the membership requirements
may join the SECPS. The membership requirements consist of general
requirements that apply to all firms and special requirements that apply
only to members with SEC clients. Appendix A of this report presents
a summary of the membership requirements and information on the
composition and level of membership.
At December 31, 1983, the membership consisted of 439 firms, of
which 428 were also members of the PCPS. According to the POB’s
report for the year ending June 30, 1983, the member firms with SEC
clients at that date audited the financial statements of 85 percent by
number, and over 98 percent by combined sales volume, of the publicly
traded companies (some of which are not SEC registrants) listed in Who
Audits America. The member firms also audited all but three of the U.S.
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and all but twentyfour of those listed on the American Stock Exchange.10
COST OF THE PROGRAM

The cost of the program measured both in dollars and in the voluntary
time commitment of participants is substantial. Annual expenditures to
administer the Division for CPA Firms and the Public Oversight Board
approximate $2.5 million. The aggregate annual costs incurred by SECPS
member firms cannot be determined with precision, but we estimate that
the costs, principally for peer review and exclusive of costs incurred
internally to install, maintain, and monitor quality control systems, are
about $6 million annually. In addition, many thousands of man-hours
are devoted annually to the program by individuals from member firms
who serve on the section’s committees and task forces.

9. Member firms reported seventy-five of the eighty-two cases pursuant to the
section’s membership requirements and reported seven additional cases that
were outside the scope of the membership requirements.
10. Data Financial Press, Who Audits America, 9th ed. (Menlo Park, California: Data
Financial Press, 1982).
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ROLE OF THE SEC

The SEC has the responsibility to monitor the practice of accountants
before the commission. In carrying out that responsibility, the commission
places considerable reliance on the profession’s programs of self-regu
lation. It actively monitors all aspects of self-regulation in the profession,
giving particular attention to the SECPS, and reports annually to Congress
on its assessment of the program’s effectiveness. The commission coor
dinates its monitoring of the section’s programs with the POB’s oversight
activities. It independently evaluates the peer review process, including
the effectiveness of POB oversight. Through its staff, it inspects a sample
of peer review work papers and POB oversight documentation under
an arrangement worked out with the SECPS. The commission does not,
however, have direct access to the special investigative process.
The commission maintains a high level of interest in the program and
actively supports its objectives. The commission has provided constructive
suggestions for improvements. The annual SEC reports to Congress on
the accounting profession have expressed interest in and general support
for the profession’s self-regulatory processes. The reports have also
identified the commission’s concerns about those processes.
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chapter 5

THE REVIEW

In our review and evaluation, we focused on matters in the following
areas.
• Public awareness of the section—enhancement of the overall effec
tiveness of the section, the viability of the concept of self
regulation, and the public perception of the concept.
• Public oversight—the structure, operations, and effectiveness of
the POB.
• Executive committee—the structure, operations, and effectiveness
of the executive committee.
• Peer review program—the standards, operations, and effectiveness
of the peer review program, as administered by the peer review
committee, including that committee’s relations with other com
ponents of the section and of the AICPA.
• Investigative process—the structure, authority, policies, operating
procedures, and effectiveness of the special investigations com
mittee and its relations with other components of the section and
of the AICPA.
• Membership and membership requirements—the level of membership
in the section and the section’s membership requirements.
• Programs to enhance benefits of membership—providing technical
information on SEC practice through annual meetings, and a
newsletter.
• Relations with PCPS—coordination of programs with the PCPS.

ENHANCING PUBLIC AWARENESS

Initiatives to enhance the public understanding of the SECPS and the
Division for CPA Firms and to clarify the concept of self-regulation
relate to the need to—
1. Achieve wider public awareness of the objectives, scope, and
limitations of self-regulation; and
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2. Attain wider public dissemination of information on the results
achieved.
A broad-based, continuing public-information program is required to
achieve better understanding by all parties concerned of the objectives,
scope, limitations, and results of self-regulation, which is essential if
expectations are to be brought into line with the realities of self-regulation.
Such a program should, of course, be directed primarily at those with
an interest in the financial reporting process.
To date, neither the AICPA nor the SECPS has undertaken an effective
program to inform the financial community of what is being done by
way of self-regulation and of the significance of membership in the
SECPS. Many members of the section have pointed to the desirability of
such a program.
In an address to AICPA Council in May 1983, John J. McCloy,
chairman of the POB, stated that
The accounting profession’s self-regulatory program is perhaps one o f its
best-kept secrets. Bankers, financial analysts, businessmen in general and
perhaps even the majority o f clients know very little about this constructive
program on which the profession has embarked.11

All of the groups that Mr. McCloy mentioned need to be informed of
the profession’s programs and the role and significance of the division.
Membership in the SECPS should emphasize to the public a firm’s
commitment to maintaining a high level of quality in its practice. A wellconceived public information program should help to educate the
financial community about the nature and significance of peer review,
the commitment to a high quality of practice by member firms, and the
special requirements for members of the SECPS.
The POB in its 1983 annual report highlighted the need for a public
information program, stating that “the subject of education and public
relations merits urgent attention.” 12According to the POB, such a
program would have multiple benefits.
Efforts to inform users o f financial statements and others about this program
appear to offer many rewards. Not only would such efforts improve the
credibility of the profession, but they might also increase membership. If
public awareness were increased, some firms that now are unwilling to incur
peer review costs and meet other membership requirements would likely
find it in their best interest to do so. This in turn would increase the
effectiveness of the program.
It should also be possible to educate nonmembers and the public about
the differences between self-regulation and governmental regulation, and
point out that self-regulation emphasizes preventive and corrective rather
than punitive action.13

11. John J. McCloy, “Accomplishments of the SECPS: the POB’s Assessment,’’
Journal of Accountancy (August 1983), pp. 56—65.
12. Public Oversight Board, Annual Report 1982—83, p. 17.
13. Ibid.
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We agree with the POB that the subject of education and public relations
merits prompt and effective attention. For the profession to receive the
recognition that the programs of the division merit, the financial com
munity must be made aware of all important aspects of those programs.
R ecommendation : An effective public information program should
be developed and implemented. It should be designed to achieve
better and broader public understanding o f the objectives and scope
of self-regulation, of the significance o f membership in the SECPS
and PCPS, and o f the nature, objectives, and results o f the programs
of the two sections.

A related concern is that the public is not aware of remedial and
corrective actions that member firms have taken as a result of the peer
review program and the investigative process, including the disciplinary
actions that firms take with respect to individuals as a result of those
processes and their own internal quality-control programs. In its 1982—
83 annual report, the POB stressed the need to make the public aware
of how the self-regulatory processes work.
The division deserves to be commended for its accomplishments in fostering
the highest quality of auditing and accounting practice by its member firms.
Yet, those accomplishments are virtually unknown by either the public that
benefits most from them or significant segments of the profession itself.
The public is not aware that the peer review and special investigative
processes materially reduce the potential for audit failure. In the opinion
o f the Board, these two important aspects o f the program have in fact
reduced the number o f audit failures by fostering and improving quality
control systems o f firms belonging to the division. The Board believes that
those who doubt the objectivity of the section’s peer review and special
investigative processes would be favorably impressed if they were made
more aware of how these processes operate and what they have accom
plished.14

The lack of awareness and understanding of the objectives of self
regulation contributes to the view that self-regulation is not rigorously
administered and is not functioning effectively because it has not resulted
in public announcements of the imposition of sanctions on firms found
to have deficiencies. A better understanding is needed, both of the
respective roles of self-regulation and public regulation and of self
regulation as a program designed to identify and correct deficiencies to
minimize future problems. This awareness can be increased by publishing
information on what is being done to reduce the potential for audit
failures by way of peer review and the investigative process.
R ecommendation : The SECPS should issue periodic public reports
providing information to the public on the scope and results o f the
peer review program and the investigative process, including infor-

14. Ibid., p. 19.
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mation on the resulting remedial and corrective actions that member
firms are required to take, without disclosing information on indi
vidual firms or breaching the confidentiality o f information reported
to, or otherwise obtained by, the special investigations committee.

The recommendations later in this report on sanctions and on the
investigative process complement and expand this recommendation.

PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD

In our review, we considered the composition, structure, and effectiveness
of the POB and possible initiatives to enhance its credibility and visibility.
The board and its staff have been successful in monitoring the peer
review program and the investigative process, suggesting improvements
to the system of self-regulation, and in reporting on and explaining the
system before regulatory bodies. The concept of public oversight con
ducted by individuals of established integrity and high reputation has
proven to be an essential element of the system of self-regulation. The
credibility of the board has been a central factor in gaining public
acceptability for self-regulation and in assuring regulatory bodies and
the public that the profession is committed to self-regulation and that
the section’s program is effective.
The POB’s public visibility is increasing. Wider dissemination of its
annual reports, the issuance of press releases, the acceptance of additional
speaking and writing engagements by its members, and similar activities
would further enhance the credibility of the program. In addition, the
POB should meet periodically with the executive committee to review
and evaluate the effectiveness of the section’s programs. Also, we note
that the POB recently met with the AICPA Board of Directors; we
suggest that such joint meetings be held periodically.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The executive committee is the governing and policy-setting body for
the SECPS and, accordingly, has a vital role in the profession’s program
of self-regulation. The effectiveness of the programs of the SECPS
depends heavily on the quality of its executive committee’s leadership
and direction. In our review of the executive committee, we considered
its size and composition, the method of selecting its members, its
responsibility for communication both within and outside the section,
and its authority to impose sanctions.
SIZE AND COMPOSITION

We considered whether the size of the executive committee and the
method of selecting its members were appropriate to current conditions
and concluded that they are satisfactory. The committee was established
with its present size and composition to assure that the program would
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be administered by a broad-based body of peers and that those most
involved in SEC practice would have an opportunity to express their
views. We see no reason for change.
The practices that individual firms follow in designating individuals
to represent them on the executive committee vary. We noted that,
occasionally, the inability of some members to speak authoritatively for
their firm made timely action by the committee more difficult. Moreover,
some designated representatives are too often represented at meetings
by alternates, who find it difficult to participate effectively in the
committee’s discussions and its decision-making process. The result is
some inconsistency in the productivity of meetings of the executive
committee. Senior personnel and continuity of representation are essen
tial to the effectiveness of the committee in carrying out its role.
The executive committee is intended to be a group of peers who
administer a program of vital significance to the profession. It deserves
the highest possible level of participation. Each firm with membership
on the committee should be represented by its chief executive or a very
senior level partner, and each designated representative should make
every effort to attend all meetings of the committee to provide the
authority, continuity, and consistency required by the program.
R ecommendation : Each firm represented on the executive committee
should designate as its representative a member of the firm who can,
with timely notice, speak authoritatively for the firm on policy issues,
and the designated representative should consider attendance at
meetings o f the executive committee to be a professional obligation.
Designated representatives who do not have reasonable assurance o f
being able to attend meetings on a regular basis should consider
having their alternates present at all meetings, regardless o f whether
or not the representative attends.

Adherence to such a policy should enhance the authority of the executive
committee and increase its effectiveness.
COMMUNICATION

Some of those we interviewed were not satisfied with the level and
effectiveness of communication among the various components of the
SECPS and between those components and AICPA units outside the
section. The executive committee should review and monitor the effec
tiveness of communication within the section, with other AICPA com
ponents, and with the POB. We considered, for example, whether there
should be more communication between the peer review committee and
the special investigations committee and between those committees and
the executive committee. We concluded that communications along those
channels can and should be improved. The two major activities within
the section—peer review and investigation—have a common aim: to
improve the quality of practice of member firms. For that reason, there
needs to be more substantive communication between the two groups
conducting those programs and between those groups and the executive
committee.
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The executive committee should maintain an active oversight of the
peer review and special investigations committees and be well-informed
about the remedial or corrective actions that result from the peer review
program and the investigative process. Those types of actions should be
recognized and emphasized as the primary means by which the objectives
of the section are achieved.
The executive committee recently began receiving more comprehensive
information about the results of the peer review program. However, we
are informed that the executive committee receives only limited infor
mation on the activities of the special investigations committee, usually
through reports by the staff and by representatives of the POB. The
executive committee should receive reports, on a regular basis, directly
from the chairman of the special investigations committee or a designee.
R ecommendation ; The executive committee should continue to
receive current and comprehensive reports from the peer review
committee and should arrange to obtain more comprehensive re
porting directly from the special investigations committee on its
activities.

SANCTIONS AGAINST MEMBER FIRMS

The executive committee has the authority to formally impose sanctions
on member firms, either on its own initiative or on the basis of
recommendations of the peer review committee or the special investi
gations committee. Experience to date has been that such formal action
has not been required and that the objectives of the section have been
served through the voluntary cooperation of members in undertaking
remedial or corrective action when deficiencies have been found. Such
cooperation, based on mutual professional respect, is essential to the
viability of the profession’s system of self-regulation. The actions that
member firms are required to take to correct deficiencies constitute the
most effective means available to the section to achieve its objectives.
As discussed in Chapter 3 of this report, formal sanctions by the
executive committee may be imposed when a member firm—
1. Refuses to abide by the membership requirements.
2. Refuses to cooperate with the peer review committee or to take
corrective action recommended as a result of a peer review.
3. Refuses to cooperate with the special investigations committee
or to take corrective action recommended by that committee.
4. Commits an egregious act for which corrective action is an
inadequate response.
In such circumstances, the principal sanctions available to the executive
committee are censures, suspensions, or expulsions of members.
The executive committee has adopted formal rules of procedure for
the imposition of sanctions, which give due consideration to the need
for the protection of a firm’s rights in such a process.
Although some terminations of membership have resulted from fail
ures to comply with the section’s membership requirements, the executive
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committee has not yet conducted a formal hearing to censure, suspend,
or expel a member. The nature of the deficiencies found and the
response of member firms in taking remedial and corrective actions as
a result of the peer review program and the investigative process have
been such as to not require further action. As previously noted, remedial
or corrective actions are the primary means that the SECPS uses to
correct deficiencies and to prevent the recurrence of such problems in
the future. Member firms have been abiding by the membership require
ments and have cooperated with the peer review committee and the
special investigations committee by taking appropriate remedial or
corrective actions regarding their quality control systems. They have
agreed to have their actions verified by accelerated peer reviews, revisits
by peer reviewers, or special peer reviews. The costs associated with such
actions, which are borne by the firms involved, are significant. An open
and rigorous peer review process that is accompanied by the prompt
follow-up and correction of noted dehciencies—which may include
additional education and training, reassignment, restriction on assign
ments, or dismissal from the firm for one or more of a firm’s partners
or professional staff—is the most effective approach.
In considering the role of sanctions in the SECPS, self-regulation must
be kept in its proper perspective. For example, when deficiencies in the
performance of a member firm in auditing the financial statements of
SEC registrants are alleged in litigation, two forms of regulation come
into play. One form is potential punitive action relating to the specific
case through the actions of regulatory agencies, such as the SEC, or
through the operation of the judicial system, or through both. The other
is potential corrective or remedial action through the self-regulatory
steps of the SECPS, whose objective is to determine whether corrective
measures are necessary on the part of the member firm involved so that
deficiencies that may have existed will be corrected and future problems
avoided. Sanctions by the SECPS may be necessary only when member
firms refuse to take such corrective action or when corrective action
alone is not sufficient.
The use of the term “sanctions” and the underlying concept are
appropriate in that context to describe the disciplinary process in the
SECPS. What is needed is a clearer communication to the public of the
differences in application and in the purpose of (1) the sanctions applied
by governmental regulatory agencies and the courts on the basis of
statutory authority and (2) the actions called for by a voluntary, selfregulatory organization for the purpose of improving the professional
performance of its members. A collateral need is for more information
to the public about the activities of the special investigations committee,
as recommended elsewhere in this report.
To help achieve a better public understanding, the executive committee
should clarify the conditions under which it would generally impose
sanctions. The clarification should stress that member firms are expected
to and do undertake corrective action when deficiencies are found, that
the emphasis is on correcting deficiencies and preventing breakdowns
in the quality control systems of member firms, and that sanctions, such
as censures, suspensions, and expulsions, are called for and will be used
in the circumstances stated above.
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R ecommendation : The executive committee should issue a statement
o f policy on the use o f its authority to impose sanctions. The statement
should emphasize that member firms agree to abide by the member
ship requirements and to undertake corrective actions for deficiencies
identified in their quality control system or in their compliance with
those systems, that they may be (and have been) required to undergo
accelerated or special peer reviews or investigations by the peer
review or special investigations committees, and that sanctions are
generally reserved for situations in which a firm refuses to take
necessary or required actions or otherwise refuses to cooperate with
the section or in which a firm is found to have committed an
egregious act for which corrective action alone would be an inade
quate response.

Such a statement of policy on the use of the authority to impose sanctions
should keep the emphasis on positive, forward-looking actions directed
at improving the quality of practice.

THE PEER REVIEW PROGRAM

In our review of the peer review program, we considered its effectiveness
in improving the quality of audit practice, the costs and benefits of peer
reviews, the consideration that should be given to litigation in determining
the scope of a peer review, the extent to which peer reviews should
evaluate the effectiveness of second-partner reviews, and what might be
done, if anything, to dispel the expectation that peer reviews should
prevent all audit failures.
EFFECTIVENESS OF PEER REVIEWS

The evidence available to us indicates that the peer review program is
working well and has proved beneficial to member firms and the public.
The written comments that we received from member firms almost
uniformly praised the benefits of peer review, but questions were raised
about the cost of the program and how it might be reduced. The statistics
on peer review summarized in Appendix A of this report indicate that
most member firms are now undergoing or preparing for their second
and some for their third review.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate through empirical
evidence the extent to which peer reviews have improved the quality of
accounting and audit practice. Improvements that can be identified may
also be attributable to other factors such as new professional standards
and guidance material, changes in personnel, and participation in training
programs. However, we are convinced that the process has improved
the quality of practice, heightened awareness of the importance of quality
control policies and procedures throughout the profession, and reduced
the potential for audit failures. To support that view, we must rely largely
on the subjective judgments of participants and those assigned to an
oversight role and on our own evaluation of information and views
presented to us.
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The POB, through its presence and its activities, helps to assure the
effectiveness of the peer review program; it has consistently praised the
program in its annual reports. The SEC, in its 1982 report to Congress
on its oversight of the accounting profession, stated that “although peer
reviews provide no assurance that all audit failure will be identified in
the future, any audit failures that occur should be due to isolated
breakdowns or ‘people problems,’ and not to inherent deficiencies in
firms’ systems of quality control.”15
The quality control systems of firms and the peer reviews of those
systems should not be expected to eliminate the possibility of an audit
failure from an isolated breakdown in the system or from “people
problems.” Although alleged failures receive considerable publicity, the
cases reported are relatively few. Of an estimated 50,000 audits of public
companies since the formation of the section’s special investigations
committee in 1979, only eighty-two situations involving alleged audit
failure have been reported to that committee.
The review of the quality control system is designed to determine
whether an appropriate system is in place and functioning properly and
to correct deficiencies if any are found. A properly functioning system
cannot guarantee that a firm will never experience “people problems”
in audit engagements, but it does help to minimize the possibility of such
problems. Quality control standards require a firm to establish policies
and procedures for, among other things, the following:
• Hiring—to provide reasonable assurance that firm personnel
possess the appropriate characteristics to enable them to perform
competently.
• Professional development—to provide reasonable assurance that
firm personnel will have the knowledge required to enable them
to fulfill assigned responsibilities.
• Assigning personnel to engagements—to provide reasonable assur
ance that the work is performed by persons having the degree
of technical training and proficiency required.
• Supervision—to provide reasonable assurance that performance
meets the firm’s standards.
• Advancement—to provide reasonable assurance that those selected
for advancement will have the qualifications necessary for ful
fillment of the responsibilities they will be called on to assume.
By determining whether such policies and procedures are in place and
functioning, peer reviews help to assure objectivity, competence, and
integrity in the conduct of audits.
In addition, any questions raised in peer reviews about the compliance
of individuals with the rules of professional conduct are referred to the
Institute’s professional ethics division for its consideration. Inspection

15. Securities and Exchange Commission, Annual Report, 1982 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982).

27

programs within firms are also concerned with the professional behavior
of individuals, and those programs interrelate with peer reviews. As a
result of a firm’s internal procedures, individuals, regardless of their
level in the firm, may be reassigned, restricted as to the type of work
that they can perform, or dismissed if serious questions arise as to their
competence, integrity, or professional performance.
We encourage continuing and enhanced emphasis in peer review and
inspection programs on firms’ policies and procedures relating to hiring,
professional development, assigning personnel to engagements, super
vision, and advancement. Consideration should be given to whether
more can be done in peer reviews and in firms’ inspection programs to
address what has been described as “people problems.” As discussed
below, we also encourage greater emphasis in peer review on determining
the effectiveness of second-partner reviews.
COSTS AND BENEFITS

Several firms cited the cost of peer reviews as their principal concern in
their written comments to us. The cost of peer review is substantial both
in terms of fees paid to reviewers and time devoted internally by reviewed
firms to the review process. Some firms believe that the cost-benefit
relationship becomes more unfavorable as a firm undergoes its second
and subsequent peer reviews, particularly when no significant deficiencies
were found in earlier reviews. Further, the benefits are highly intangible
and difficult to measure. However, the benefits are to be found in the
improved quality of practice, the heightened prestige and credibility of
the profession, and the enhanced personal pride and satisfaction of
practitioners as professionals. We believe these benefits are present, even
though difficult to quantify, and that they justify the costs incurred, both
in time and money.
PEER REVIEW TIME INTERVAL

Some firms have questioned the need for a member firm to undergo a
peer review every three years, particularly where two reviews have been
conducted and no serious deficiencies have been found. Extending the
interval has been proposed as a means of reducing the cost of peer
review. An SECPS task force on membership requirements considered
the issue in 1981 and recommended extending the length of the interval
beyond the present three-year period. The executive committee rejected
that recommendation. The POB opposed, and continues to oppose, any
extension of the interval. It expressed the view that an extension “would
have decreased, or would have been perceived to have decreased, the
effectiveness of the process.”16
We are sympathetic to efforts to reduce the cost of peer reviews.
However, we agree with the POB that extending the interval or making
fundamental changes in the peer review program not only may limit its

16. Public Oversight Board, Annual Report, 1982—83, p. 17.
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effectiveness but, further, m ight serve to weaken public perception o f
the p rofession’s com m itm ent to quality control, because experience with
the program is still relatively lim ited.

R ecommendation : The three-year interval for peer reviews should
be retained and no other fundamental changes should be made in
peer review procedures that might be perceived as a lessening o f
the commitment to the profession’s program o f self-regulation. The
executive committee should continue to review periodically the
appropriateness o f the time interval for peer review and other aspects
of the program as more experience is gained.
LITIGATION AND THE SCOPE OF PEER REVIEWS

A n issue resolved by the SECPS during our review relates to the
consideration that should be given to litigation in determ ining the scope
o f a peer review. O n the recom m endation o f the special investigations
com m ittee and o f the POB that such consideration be m ade a form al
peer review requirem ent, the executive com m ittee and the peer review
com m ittee have agreed to im plem ent that suggestion. W e support that
decision.
SECOND-PARTNER REVIEWS

T h e SECPS’s m em bership requirem ents call for a concurring secondpartner review o f the audit report on each SEC en gagem ent by a partner
other than the partner in charge o f the engagem ent before issuance o f
the report. H ow ever, excep t for the m andate to review com pliance with
the m em bership requirem ents, there is nothing in the standards for peer
review or the related guidance m aterial that w ould require an evaluation
o f the scope and effectiveness o f such a review. We consider such an
evaluation to be an im portant part o f a peer review.

R ecommendation: The SECPS Executive Committee should strengthen
standards for what constitutes a second-partner review in SEC
engagements so that both member firms and peer reviewers have a
better understanding o f what is expected. The standards should
address matters such as the qualifications o f the second partner, the
general scope and extent of the review, and the record o f the review.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE
T h e special investigations com m ittee was established in recognition o f
the significant public interest in those situations that tend to adversely
affect the public’s confidence in the reliability o f the financial statem ents
o f SEC registrants and the efficacy o f the audit process. C oncurrent with
the establishm ent o f the com m ittee, guidelines were adopted that w ere
intend ed to achieve a balance betw een the public interest and the legal
rights o f m em ber firms. In our review o f the com m ittee, we addressed
questions relating to its m andate and authority, its ability to investigate
cases, the confidentiality surrounding its operations, the reporting re-

29

quirem ent for m em ber firms, and its relations with the other com ponents
o f the SECPS and the AICPA.
In our opinion, the special investigations com m ittee has operated
effectively within the guidelines established by the executive com m ittee
and has determ in ed w hether facts relating to alleged audit failures
indicate the n eed for corrective action by m em ber firms or for changes
in professional standards.
STRUCTURE AND AUTHORITY

T h e special investigations com m ittee has perform ed a difficult assignm ent
in a creditable m anner. A lthough the com m ittee takes various actions as
d eem ed appropriate in connection with m em ber firms involved in
litigation in which an audit failure is alleged, the practicality o f legal
constraints inheren t in self-regulation prevents the com m ittee, as pres
ently constituted in the private sector, from acting effectively as a quasi
judicial body in conductin g an “investigation o f a case.” It is lim ited in
its capacity because it does not have (1) a legislative m andate, (2) the
pow er o f subpoena, (3) the right to exam ine or cross-exam ine witnesses,
and (4) the ability to com pel m em ber firms or their clients to m ake
available evid en ce relating to litigation. M em ber firms have certain rights
and legitim ate interests concerning litigation involving the firm. M ore
over, the cases reported to the com m ittee are often concurrently und er
investigation by the SEC or other regulatory bodies.
T h e com m ittee’s organizational docum ent recognizes that considera
tion should be given to the substantial prejudice against a firm or
individuals in the firm that could develop if it w ere to com m ence and
continue an investigation o f the w orking papers and related evidence in
a specific case while the firm or individuals in it are involved, or about
to be involved, in a court proceed ing or a proceeding or investigation
by the SEC, a grand jury, or other governm ental body. By the tim e those
processes are com p leted and conclusions have been reached, direct
investigation o f the evidence in the case by the com m ittee to determ ine
w hether there have been deficiencies in auditing would be largely
untim ely and irrelevant.
In rare cases, the special investigations com m ittee has the authority,
with the approval o f the executive com m ittee, to investigate directly the
w orking papers and other evidence in specific cases involved in litigation.
H ow ever, such action has not been feasible for the reasons stated above
and as further explained in the com m ittee’s organizational docum ent.
T h e com m ittee has screened and m onitored such cases and has conducted
special investigations o f m em ber firms involved in som e o f those cases.
T h ese investigations have consisted o f attem pting to find out as m uch
as possible about the case from public docum ents and from the m em ber
firm on a voluntary basis and o f perform ing special reviews o f one or
m ore areas that are related to the case, such as specific offices or
individuals, certain industry specialities, or specific quality control policies
and procedures. Such investigations, which are essentially special peer
reviews, are in ten d ed to be preventive rather than punitive and to
determ ine w hether corrective action has been taken or should be taken
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by m em ber firms to im prove the quality o f their professional practice
and to help prevent such occurrences in the future. M em ber firms
involved have cooperated with the com m ittee and, in all instances, have
taken recom m en ded actions.
T h e com m ittee’s organizational docum ent draws a distinction betw een
the “investigation o f a firm ” and the “investigation o f a case.” T h e form er
is what the com m ittee has been d oing in practice w henever it goes beyond
screening and m onitoring. T h e latter involves a direct investigation o f
the w orking papers and other evidence in a specific case, which, for
reasons we consider valid, the com m ittee has not undertaken.
Since all o f the activities o f the com m ittee are a form o f investigation
and result from and relate to cases in litigation, confusion m ight be
avoided by elim inating the terms, “investigation o f a case” and “investi
gation o f a firm .” Instead, the organizational docum ent should be revised
to reflect the concept that the com m ittee will take whatever action is
deem ed appropriate in the circum stances with respect to each case
reported to it. T h e investigative process w ould still involve screening,
m onitoring, and, w henever necessary, additional investigation. T h e
com m ittee w ould decide the scope o f the investigation in each case, after
considering all the facts and circum stances, which w ould probably be
along the lines that the com m ittee has been follow ing in practice.
O ne o f the general m em bership requirem ents states that m em ber
firms should cooperate with the special investigations com m ittee. H ow 
ever, there has been no specific requirem ent that firms provide in for
m ation about the issues involved in a case in litigation beyond what is
publicly available. W hile inform ation has been obtained on a voluntary
basis, w hen requested by the com m ittee, that basis is too tenuous if the
com m ittee is to have the necessary credibility to carry out its m ission
successfully. M em ber firms should be required to m ake available sufficient
inform ation (but not the w orking papers or other direct evidence in a
specific case) so that the com m ittee can decide w hether to conduct a
tim ely review o f pertinent aspects o f the firm ’s organization and quality
control system to determ ine w hether corrective action on the part o f the
firm is necessary. T o be consistent with that approach, sanctions w ould
be im posed on m em ber firms if they either refuse to cooperate in the
m anner described above or refuse to take the necessary corrective action
as requested by the com m ittee.

R ecommendation : The organizational document o f the special in
vestigations committee should be revised: (1) to describe the com
mittee’s investigative authority based on the concept that member
firms should be required to furnish sufficient information (but not
the working papers or other direct evidence in a specific case) so
that the committee can determine whether special reviews o f the
quality control system of the firm are necessary to enable it to
determine whether any corrective action, beyond what the member
firm may have already undertaken, is necessary; (2) to eliminate the
terms “an investigation o f a case” and “an investigation o f a firm,”
as descriptions o f different modes o f the committee’s investigative
activities; and (3) to indicate that the committee is authorized to
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recommend sanctions to the executive committee in cases in which
a member firm refuses to cooperate or to take any corrective action
requested.
T h e special investigations com m ittee’s organizational d ocum ent is
om itted from the SECPS m anual and is not readily available in any other
publication o f the section. T his om ission has contributed to the confusion
concerning the role o f the com m ittee. T h e docum ent should be included
in the m anual.
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

In the discussion elsew here in this report (pages 19—22) o f the need to
enhance public awareness o f self-regulation, we recom m end that som e
degree o f public disclosure relating to rem edial and corrective action in
the peer review and investigative processes should be considered. In our
review o f the special investigations com m ittee, we addressed the question
o f w hether the confidentiality o f its activities should be m odified to
provide SEC access as well as to perm it public disclosure o f inform ation
on the actions resulting from the process.
Because o f the possible prejudice against m em ber firms in the pro
ceedings o f the special investigations com m ittee and on the advice o f
legal counsel, the executive com m ittee originally decided that the activities
o f the special investigations com m ittee should be conducted und er
conditions o f confidentiality. Accordingly, although there have been
highly publicized instances o f alleged audit failure, only general in for
m ation about the com m ittee’s activities has been released. T h e public is
largely unaw are o f the actions taken by the com m ittee and the rem edial
and corrective m easures that have resulted.
Confidentiality on m atters relating to specific cases still appears to be
desirable because o f the voluntary nature o f the SECPS, the possibility
o f substantial and often unw arranted prejudice against m em ber firms,
and the fact that the public interest has been adequately protected by
the procedures follow ed by the com m ittee and the regulatory and court
processes. H ow ever, som e public inform ation about the actions taken in
the investigative process is n eed ed to enhance the credibility o f the
process. T h e com m ittee should periodically report to the public on its
activities using a form at that w ould not identify firms or cases and that
m ight encom pass, at least, the following:
•
•
•

•
•
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A description o f the com m ittee’s operations, o f its objectives, and
o f the m eans used to assure com pliance.
A ggregated data and statistics on the num ber and types o f cases
reported, closed, and still active.
A ggregated data and statistics on the num ber and types o f
rem edial or corrective actions taken voluntarily by firms, either
on their ow n initiatives or as a result o f the investigative process.
A discussion o f unusual matters encountered in the process.
Inform ation on closed cases, describing by general categories the
reasons for closing the cases.

•

Data on, and discussions of, matters referred to standard-setting
bodies.

Such a report w ould provide the public and the SEC with inform ation
about the investigative process that should enhance its credibility.

R ecommendation : The special investigations committee should issue
at least annually a public report on its activities covering at a
minimum the types o f inform ation indicated above.
In addition to d evelop ing a form at for public reporting, the SECPS
should consider providing the profession with educational materials
based on findings in the investigative process. T h e inform ation develop ed
and the conclusions reached in the investigative process on the nature
o f the facts and circum stances that contribute to allegations o f audit
failure in specific cases can be the source o f valuable educational m aterial
for the profession and should be accum ulated and distributed. T h e
com m ittee should accum ulate relevant inform ation relating to the matters
on its agenda and periodically have analyses o f such inform ation prepared
and dissem inated for the education o f the profession, w ithout breaching
the essential confidentiality o f the process.

R ecommendation : The SECPS should make available in a manner
appropriate for educational purposes inform ation about unusual or
recurring problems encountered in the investigative process.
M em ber firms, other firms, regulators, academics, and others w ould
ben efit from the availability o f such inform ation.
REPORTING REQUIREMENT FOR MEMBER FIRMS

We considered w hether the requirem ent for m em ber firms to report
certain litigation to the special investigations com m ittee should be e x 
panded to include cases involving non-SEC registrants in which there is
a significant public interest and obtained the advice o f counsel on legal
considerations that m ight be involved. As previously indicated, the
investigative and peer review processes are similar in that both are
intend ed to help m em ber firms attain and maintain appropriate quality
control. For that reason, we believe it is tim e to reconsider the requirem ent
that only litigation involving SEC registrants be reported.
A quality control d e ficiency that results in an audit failure relating to
a client that is not an SEC registrant could, in the absence o f som e
additional special safeguards, have the same result in connection with
the audit o f an SEC registrant. T h e com m ittee, in the past, has added
to its agenda a lim ited num ber o f cases involving entities that are not
SEC registrants. Because o f the construction o f the reporting require
m ent, it was fou n d necessary in such instances to approach the firms
involved and encourage them to report such matters voluntarily.
A lthough that approach worked in those instances, the efficacy o f the
process and the public credibility it obtains w ould be enhanced if the
reporting requirem ent was broadened. Ideally, it could be argued that
all alleged audit failures should be reported; how ever, since the primary
thrust o f the SECPS relates to the im provem ent o f the quality o f practice
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before the SEC, w e conclude that the requirem ent should only be
broadened to include cases involving entities that, although not SEC
registrants, are o f such interest to the general and financial public that
a distinction betw een them and SEC registrants should not be m ade.
O ne approach, for exam ple, w ould be to broaden the present requirem ent
to cover reporting cases against a firm or its personnel that involve nonSEC clients or form er clients with $50 m illion or m ore in total assets.
Such a provision should be adequate to cover m ost non-SEC registrants
in which there is a sufficient public interest, such as banks, savings and
loan associations, insurance com panies, and brokers and dealers in
securities. H ow ever, m ore study is need ed to arrive at a definitive
statem ent o f the requirem ent.

R ecommendation : The membership requirement for reporting cases
to the special investigations committee should be extended to cover
cases involving all entities in which there is a significant public
interest.
COSTS OF INVESTIGATIONS

We considered w hether the cost o f an investigation should be borne by
the investigated firm. T o date, investigations o f firms, which are essentially
special peer reviews o f certain aspects o f a firm ’s quality controls, have
been conducted by a special task force or by the investigated firm ’s peer
reviewers. T h e costs o f reviews conducted by a special task force have
been borne by the section, while the costs o f reviews conducted by the
investigated firm s’ peer reviewers have been borne by the firm. We see
no reasons why the costs o f both types o f reviews should not be handled
in the sam e m anner.

R ecommendation : The cost of a special peer review conducted in
an investigation of a firm should be borne by the investigated firm
without regard to whether the review is conducted by the firm’s peer
reviewers or by a special task force.
T h e adoption o f that policy w ould m ake the process m ore equitable.
IMPLICATIONS FOR TECHNICAL STANDARDS

A n issue brought to our attention relates to w hether there is a need to
im prove com m unications betw een the special investigations com m ittee
and standard-setting bodies with respect to the im plications for accounting
and auditing standards that are brought to light in investigations o f
instances o f alleged audit failure. It is im portant that the com m ittee
continue and intensify its efforts to identify and com m unicate prom ptly
any such im plications. T h e executive com m ittee should review and assess
the adequacy o f existing liaison arrangem ents with the A uditing Stand
ards Board and the A ccounting Standards Executive Com m ittee.
SIZE AND COMPOSITION

We also considered the size and com position o f the com m ittee and the
qualifications to serve on it. For exam ple, we considered w hether
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m em bership on the com m ittee should be lim ited to active partners o f
CPA firms or w hether there should be som e predeterm ined ratio o f
active and retired partners. Som e persons contend that to make the
investigative process m ore effective, the com m ittee should be com posed
only o f active partners. We disagree with that view. T h e advantages o f
having retired partners serve on the com m ittee relate to their experience,
objectivity, com m itm ent, and ability to devote the necessary tim e to the
com m ittee’s activities. At present, five o f the nine m em bers o f the
com m ittee are retired partners, and the chairm an is an active partner.
Such a m ix o f retired and active partners is reasonable.

MEMBERSHIP
We considered the level o f SECPS m em bership in relation to the total
num ber o f firms with SEC clients and w hether, as som e have suggested,
m em bership should be restricted to firms that have SEC practices. T h e
level o f m em bership is reasonable for a voluntary program . H owever,
we encourage continuation o f vigorous efforts to attract as m em bers all
firms with SEC clients, especially those that have chosen to jo in only the
PCPS. T h e im plem entation o f the recom m endations in this report for
wider publicity about the section should help to make such efforts m ore
fruitful. A lso, firms that do not have SEC practices should continue to
be allow ed and encouraged to be m em bers o f the SECPS.
We review ed the m em bership requirem ents o f the section and fou n d
them to be satisfactory.

PROGRAMS TO ENHANCE THE BENEFITS OF
MEMBERSHIP
O ther m atters that cam e to our attention relate broadly to what can be
described as the need to establish and broaden program s to enhance
benefits o f m em bership and to enhance the professional com petence o f
m em bers. T h e possibilities considered include im plem enting the section’s
objective to provide technical inform ation on SEC practice and additional
m em ber services such as an annual m eeting and a newsletter.
PROVIDING TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON SEC
PRACTICE

T h e objectives o f the SECPS, as stated in its organizational docum ent,
establish its goals and provide criteria for evaluating its perform ance. In
our review and evaluation, we considered w hether the stated objectives
should be m odified and conclude that they rem ain appropriate.
O ne o f the stated objectives o f the SECPS is to provide a forum for
the develop m en t o f technical inform ation relating to SEC practice. T h e
section has d on e little to im plem ent that objective, and som e o f the
written com m ents we received from m em ber firms suggest that the
section should do m ore. O ur recom m endations that follow for an annual
m eeting and for a newsletter should help to fill that need.

35

ANNUAL MEETINGS

In considering ways to enhance the benefits o f m em bership, we discussed
the desirability o f annual m eetings o f SECPS m em ber firms. Based on
their written com m ents to us, at least som e m em ber firms believe that
an annual m eetin g is desirable and others stress the need for im proved
com m unications am ong m em ber firms. A nnual m eetings o f m em ber
firms could serve as forum s for discussions o f technical and professional
matters o f com m on interest to m em bers and w ould help to reinforce the
sense o f participation with peers in a program o f self-regulation and
self-im provem ent. Such m eetings should be design ed to help achieve the
primary objective o f the section, that is, to im prove the quality o f practice
before the SEC. T h e PCPS has held several annual conferences for its
m em bers. A similar program stressing technical and professional devel
opm ents relating to SEC practice should be considered.

R ecommendation : The SECPS should hold annual meetings of
member firms as technical and professional forums on SEC practice
matters. Such meetings should be rigorously evaluated to assure that
they meet their purpose.
O ur intent is not sim ply to add m ore m eetings nor, certainly, to establish
a program that com petes with the PCPS conference or the annual
AICPA—SEC conference or other m eetings. Rather, it is to present a
program design ed to achieve specific objectives, a program that com p le
m ents other m eetings by em phasizing matters o f special interest to SECPS
m em ber firms and by providing opportunities for discussions o f com m on
problem s.
NEWSLETTER

We believe that it w ould be desirable for the SECPS to issue a regular
new sletter on its activities and on current professional and technical
developm ents o f particular interest to its m em bers.

R ecommendation ; The SECPS should publish a quarterly newsletter
for its members.
A regular new sletter could help to im prove com m unication within the
section.

COORDINATION WITH THE PRIVATE
COMPANIES PRACTICE SECTION
T h e Division for CPA Firms was established as two autonom ous and
largely in d ep en d en t sections, the SECPS and the PCPS, in recognition
o f significant d ifferen ces in the practices and needs o f differen t types o f
firms. T h e two sections have d evelop ed similar program s aim ed at
im proving the accounting and audit practices o f their m em ber firms.
T h e structure has worked well and has afforded firms o f all sizes the
opportunity to participate in the profession’s program o f self-regulation.
H ow ever, since the two sections share a com m on objective— to im prove
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the quality o f the accounting and audit practice in CPA firms, primarily
by reliance on peer reviews— and since their basic structure, program s,
and operations are similar, they need to work closely together to resolve
com m on problem s m ore effectively, such as the n eed to develop an
effective public inform ation program . In the past, the two sections have
cooperated through ad hoc groups to develop join t program s, but steps
should be taken that will better prom ote and assure such cooperation.
T h erefore, an organizational structure should be established to facil
itate and encourage greater coordination betw een the two sections in
identifying and dealing with com m on problems. W e suggest that a
standing coordinating com m ittee consisting o f persons selected from
m em bers o f the executive com m ittee o f each section be form ed to
accom plish that objective.

R ecommendation : The executive committees of the SECPS and the
PCPS should form a standing coordinating committee consisting o f
persons selected from members o f the two executive committees
with the responsibility of exploring ways to improve coordination
between the two sections and to deal with common problems.
Such a coordinating com m ittee should consider ways to achieve a better
understanding o f com m on problem s and recom m end solutions for
consideration by the executive com m ittees o f the two sections.
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chapter 6

SUMMATION

In this report, we present the opinions and conclusions reached in our
review and evaluation o f the SECPS. T h e first six years o f the section’s
existence have seen significant accom plishm ents, but, m ost im portantly,
they have been a learning experience. T h e SECPS has established
program s to im prove the quality o f practice o f m em ber firms, which in
their totality have proven to be a vital and successful aspect o f the
profession’s system o f self-regulation. O ur overall evaluation is that the
SECPS’s program s and processes are functioning well. T h e POB, an
essential elem en t o f the system o f self-regulation, has been effective in
m onitoring the section and in representing the public interest. T h e SEC’s
m onitoring o f the section has been constructive and supportive. T h e
profession, the AIC PA, and the participants in the section can take pride
in the SECPS and in its results.
D espite our overall favorable evaluations o f the SECPS and its program s
and processes, we recom m end in this report a num ber o f initiatives and
actions to im prove the section’s effectiveness. O ne o f the central thrusts
o f those recom m endations relates to the need to inform the public and
various constituencies about the nature and results o f a system o f self
regulation and to place it in its proper perspective. O ther suggestions
are in ten d ed to expand the benefits o f m em bership and create program s
to enhance professionalism and to achieve greater coordination in the
overall system o f self-regulation.
We find that the accounting profession, a profession entrusted with
the responsibility o f regulating itself, is d oin g a creditable job o f self
regulation. W e encourage all CPA firms with SEC clients and other firms
to help further the program by jo in in g the SECPS.
A lthough the SECPS merits high marks on its perform ance to date,
the profession cannot afford to be com placent about the results. In the
long run, it will be ju d g e d not by the particulars o f its program s and its
own analysis and evaluation o f them , but by how effectively it perform s
audits. H en ce, the profession m ust continually m onitor and evaluate its
own perform ance and, on a tim ely basis, take the steps that are necessary
and appropriate to assure that the quality o f that perform ance m eets
the needs o f the public.
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APPENDIXES

appendix A

THE SECPS: DEVELOPMENT,
STRUCTURE, OPERATIONS, AND
RESULTS

In this appendix, we review the events that led to the formation o f the AICPA
Division for CPA Firms, describe the present organizational structure of the
SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of the Division for CPA Firms and the operations
of its major components, and review its activities during its first six years of
operations. It is intended to provide background for the discussion and findings
in the body o f our report.

DEVELOPING A PROGRAM OF SELF-REGULATION
FOR CPA FIRMS
The accounting profession, like other professions, provides designated services
to the public, and there is a high level of public interest in the quality o f the
services provided. Society has generally permitted the professions to establish
and enforce the standards that regulate their members. The accounting profes
sion has vigorously sought to protect its right to regulate itself and to retain
public trust. The AICPA Division for CPA Firms was formed as a result o f such
efforts. It was created in the latter half of the 1970s during a period in which
the profession faced criticism of its performance and pressure to reform and
strengthen all elements o f self-regulation.
ROLE OF THE AICPA

The Division for CPA Firms, consisting o f the SECPS and the Private Companies
Practice Section (PCPS), was created by the AICPA and is an integral part o f it.
The AICPA is a voluntary professional association consisting of more than
200,000 CPAs, about half of whom are engaged in the practice of public
accounting. It has been the principal force in the self-regulation of CPAs for
nearly a century since its formation in 1887. The AICPA derives most o f its
authority from its position as the national organization of CPAs and from its
ability to admit individuals to membership and to suspend or expel them.1Thus,

1. The state societies of CPAs, the voluntary professional organizations at the local level, are
independent of the AICPA and have their own codes of professional ethics. Through their
compliance and enforcement activities, they also play a significant role in self-regulation
in close cooperation with the AICPA.
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until recently, it has been primarily concerned with the regulation o f individual
CPAs through its influence on education and entrance standards, through its
role in developing technical standards, and through its code o f professional
ethics. Not until 1977 did the AICPA establish an organizational structure for
the regulation o f CPA firms.
SHIFTING THE FOCUS TO CPA FIRMS

During the 1970s, the profession and the AICPA came under close scrutiny
and criticism by Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Among the areas o f major concern was the need for programs to monitor and
improve the quality of accounting and audit practice in CPA firms. In response,
the profession took initiatives to develop programs to improve its performance
and to better meet public expectations, which led to the formation o f the
Division for CPA Firms.
A series o f developments and initiatives preceded the establishment of the
division. In 1972, the SEC proposed that the Institute develop a program for
reviewing the quality control systems o f CPA firms practicing before the SEC.
It sought to use such a review program in connection with SEC Rule 2(e)
proceedings. In response, the Institute appointed an ad hoc committee that
developed a program under which the Institute cooperated with the SEC by
supplying reviewers for SEC-mandated reviews.2 Concurrently, the Institute
developed a program for voluntary reviews of the quality control procedures
o f multi-office firms.3
Although the program for voluntary reviews did not gain wide acceptance,
the Institute had recognized the significance of firms in the profession and the
need to develop a structure for the self-regulation of CPA firms. In 1975, an
Institute special committee studied the broad issue o f self-regulation. The charge
to that committee described the changes in the environment that were to be
considered:
The public accounting profession’s organizational structure was established at a time
when the largest national CPA firms were a great deal smaller than the present
national and international giants. Practice was also less complex and the Securities
and Exchange Commission did not appear on the scene until many years after the
AICPA was organized. It is not surprising, therefore, that the profession’s structure
was designed to provide for the regulation and discipline of individuals rather than
practice units.
The emergence of very large CPA firms and the explosive growth in the
complexities of practice have resulted in questions being posed as to the need for
regulation of firms. Accordingly, the appointment of a special committee has been
authorized to study the present system of regulation of the profession to determine
its adequacy in the light of today’s circumstances.

The special committee developed a comprehensive plan for voluntary regis
tration of CPA firms found to have met certain quality control standards in
their accounting and audit practices. The plan, revised to delete the registration
provision requirement and to limit its application to firms with SEC practices,

2. AICPA, A Tentative Program for an Inspection of Quality Control Standards and Procedures of an
Accounting Firm Pursuant to Rule 2 (e) of the SEC Rules of Practice (New York: AICPA, 1974).
3. AICPA, Special Committee to Study Quality Review for Multi-Office Firms, Plan for
Implementation of AICPA Voluntary Program for Reviews of Quality Control Procedures of MultiOffice Firms (New York: AICPA, 1974).
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was approved by AICPA Council (the governing body of the Institute).4 The
Council appointed a standing committee on quality control standards (later
made a senior technical committee with the authority to issue standards for
quality control for the accounting and audit practice of firms) to develop
procedures for conducting reviews.5
By the time the voluntary quality control review program was in place, the
Division for CPA Firms had been established with its own peer review committees,
and the procedures developed for the voluntary program served as the
foundation for the self-regulatory program of the Division for CPA Firms. The
formation o f the division represented a fundamental shift in the concept and
focus o f self-regulation in the profession.
CREATION OF THE DIVISION FOR CPA FIRMS

In a July 1976 report, an Institute special committee, formed to study proposals
to restructure the profession, proposed to the AICPA Board o f Directors a
membership structure within the Institute for CPA firms. The proposal was
accepted, but no steps were taken immediately to implement it. In May 1977,
the AICPA Board o f Directors accepted a proposal that had been developed by
an ad hoc group under the direction o f the then AICPA chairman, Michael N.
Chetkovich, and the then AICPA president, Wallace E. Olson, to establish a
membership division for SEC practice firms and a membership division for
private companies practice firms. AICPA Council approved a slightly modified
version o f that proposal in the fall of 1977 after extensive debate.
The Division for CPA Firms, which became operational in 1978, provides a
voluntary organizational structure within the Institute for the self-regulation of
CPA firms. It consists o f two autonomous and largely independent sections,
SECPS, primarily for firms that practice before the SEC, and the PCPS. The
sections are not exclusive; firms may join either or both without regard to
whether they have SEC clients. The discussion in this appendix is generally
limited to the SECPS, which is the section our committee was formed to study.

OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
OF THE SECPS
The SECPS is designed to provide the public with reasonable assurance that its
members adhere to the standards of the profession in their accounting and
audit practice, but especially in their practice before the SEC. Its structure and
operating rules have evolved as experience was gained in implementing previ
ously untried concepts and procedures.
OBJECTIVES

The current objectives of the SECPS incorporate the goals it seeks to achieve
and provide criteria for evaluating its performance. The SECPS seeks

4. Discussion Draft, Proposed Plan for Voluntary Quality Control Review Program for CPA Firms
with SEC Practices (New York: AICPA 1976).
5. The Quality Control Standards Committee was disbanded in 1983 upon its own request,
since it could not identify a need for additional standards or interpretations. The Auditing
Standards Board is now responsible for identifying emerging practice needs in this area.
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1.

2.

3.

4.

Improve the quality o f practice by CPA firms before the Securities and
Exchange Commission through the establishment o f practice require
ments for member firms.
Establish and maintain an effective system o f self-regulation of member
firms by means of mandatory peer reviews, required maintenance of
appropriate quality controls, and the imposition of sanctions for failure
to meet membership requirements.
Enhance the effectiveness of the section’s regulatory system through
the monitoring and evaluation activities of an independent oversight
board composed o f public members.
Provide a forum for development of technical information relating to
SEC practice.

MAJOR COMPONENTS

The work o f the SECPS is administered by three major committees (the executive
committee, the peer review committee, and the special investigations committee)
with the support o f AICPA staff, including the staff o f the AICPA Quality
Control Review Division (QCRD). The Public Oversight Board (POB), an
independent organization composed primarily of non-CPAs and supported by
its own staff, provides oversight o f all the activities o f the section, reports to the
public on those activities, and keeps the SEC informed in that regard.
The AICPA president designates staff for the components o f the SECPS.
Thomas P. Kelley, AICPA vice president-technical, has responsibility for staff
support for the operations o f all o f the components o f the section and personally
provides the staff support to the executive committee. He is assisted by a
technical manager, Arthur Renner, the major portion of whose time is devoted
to providing staff support to the special investigations committee. The QCRD
has a staff o f thirteen, including a director (Dale Rafal) and six other CPAs. It
provides staff support to the peer review committees of both the SECPS and
the PCPS under the overall supervision of Mr. Kelley and in close consultation
with the chairmen o f the two peer review committees.
The section’s administrative cost and that o f the QCRD, including staff and
normal meeting costs, are met from the AICPA’s general budget. The cost o f
the POB and its staff and the cost o f special projects are paid from SECPS dues.
Expenditures for 1982-83 and budgeted expenditures for 1983-84 for the
Division for CPA Firms, including the operations of the QCRD, and for the
POB are as shown in the following tabulations:

Division for CPA Firms
Public Oversight Board
Quality Control Review Division
Totals
Less quality control revenue
Net expenditures

Budgeted
Actual
1983-84
1982-83
(000 omitted)
$ 695
$ 728
900
866
908
791
$2,385
$2,503
110
$2.393

100
$2.285

The principal source o f revenue is from administrative charges for reviews
conducted by committee-appointed review teams.
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MEMBERSHIP AND MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS
Membership in the SECPS is voluntary, and the incentives for firms to join and
participate derive primarily from a firm’s interest in maintaining high-quality
practice. The membership requirements are designed to improve the quality of
practice in member firms and to provide the public with information about
member firms.
REQUIREMENTS FOR MEMBERSHIP

Any CPA firm may j oin the SECPS. To become a member, a firm must submit
an application with certain required information and agree to abide by the
membership requirements. The SECPS has certain membership requirements
that apply to all members and others that apply only to members with SEC
clients. Under the general membership requirements, which are similar to those
o f the PCPS, every member firm must agree to do the following:
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.
6.
7.

Ensure that a majority of the members of the firm are CPAs, that the
firm can legally engage in the practice of public accounting, and that
each partner (or equivalent) resident in the United States and eligible
for AICPA membership is a member of the AICPA.
Adhere to quality control standards established by the AICPA.
Submit to peer reviews, conducted in accordance with review standards
established by the peer review committee, of the firm’s accounting and
audit practice at least once every three years and at such additional
times as may be required by the executive committee.
Ensure that each CPA or non-CPA professional in the firm resident in
the United States participates in at least one hundred and twenty hours
o f continuing professional education every three years and in at least
twenty hours every year or, alternatively, complies with the mandatory
CPE requirements for state licensing or for state society membership
in states in which such requirements average forty hours a reporting
period.
File designated information about the firm for each fiscal year for
inclusion in its public file.
Maintain at least the minimum amounts and types o f accountants’
liability insurance prescribed by the executive committee.
Pay dues, comply with the rules and regulations of the section, cooperate
with the peer review committee and the special investigations committee,
and comply with any sanctions imposed.

In addition to the general membership requirements, member firms with
SEC clients must also agree to do the following:
1.

2.
3.

Rotate audit partners on SEC engagements no less frequently than
every seven years if the firm has five or more SEC clients and ten or
more partners.
Ensure that a second-partner review is made before issuance o f an
audit report on the financial statements o f an SEC registrant.
Adhere to independence requirements in performing management
advisory services (MAS) for audit clients whose securities are registered
with the SEC, abide by certain restrictions on MAS work for SEC clients,
and file certain information about MAS services for SEC clients for
inclusion in the firm’s public file.
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48
34979

418

9002

1290

17
330
780
1934
1674
881
29363

17
95
99
120
50
13
24

139
540
359
221
31

139
1718
2706
3423
1016

Members

Firms

Members

Both
PCPS and SECPS
Firms

PCPS Only

1
9
52

20

82

1

10

Members

1
2
6

Firms

SECPS Only

1718

157
637
464
342
81
13
24

Firms

44063

157
2057
3538
5377
2690
881
29363

Members

Totals for the
Division for Firms

23449
24537
11131
9677
3384
998
29363
102539

34516

Members

23449
8771
1515
640
102
15
___ 24

Firms

AICPA
Membership

1%
8%
32%
56%
79%
88%

100%
43%

1%

100%
5%

Members
7%
31%
53%
79%
87%

Firms

Percentage*
Penetration of
AICPA Membership

637
464
_342
1443

2-5
6-10
11-25
Totals

2057
3538
5377
10972

AICPA Members

117
24
6
147

340
171
107
618

Numbers Based on
Division Data (CPAs)
Firms
AICPA Members

18%
5%
2%
10%

Firms

17%
5%
2%
6%

AICPA Members

Percentages of

____ Totals in Category____

The three largest size categories were completely reconciled to AICPA membership records. Thus, the classifications by firm size based on AICPA members is a close approximation
based on the best available data.

Firms

Size Category

____ Totals in Category____

Note: The information in this table was compiled from two separate data bases: AICPA membership records and the membership records for the Division for CPA Firms. The data
on AICPA members in public practice and their firm-size classifications were taken from a computer-generated analysis of AICPA membership records. The membership records
for the Division for CPA Firms classify member firms based on the number of CPAs reported by those firms instead of AICPA members. For that reason, the number of AICPA
members in each member firm was compiled manually from AICPA membership records to the extent feasible. However, the division’s classification of member firms with one CPA
was treated as equivalent to firms with one AICPA member without cross-checking the classification to AICPA membership records. Other size categories include firms for which
the number of CPAs reported were considered equivalent to AICPA members in the firm as follows.

* Rounded to nearest whole percentage

Totals

2-5
6-10
11-25
26-50
51-100
over 100

1

Firm Size
By Number of
AICPA Members

Table 1
Comparison of Membership in the Division for CPA Firms with AlCPA Members in Public Practice
As of April 19, 1983

4.
5.

6.

Report annually to the audit committee or board of directors o f each
SEC audit client on the total fees received from the client for MAS.
Report to the audit committee or board of directors o f each SEC audit
client on the nature of disagreements with the management of the
client that, if not resolved, would have caused the firm to modify its
report,
Report to the special investigations committee certain litigation, pro
ceedings, or investigations involving SEC clients.

A firm may resign from the section if at the time of its resignation it is not
subject to any form o f disciplinary proceeding or review. The executive
committee may, among other things, terminate a firm’s membership for the
failure to adhere to the requirements o f membership.
LEVEL OF MEMBERSHIP

The ability o f the division to attract as members a major portion of AICPA
members in public practice is a factor in assessing its effectiveness. Table 1 on
page 48 analyzes and compares division membership with CPA firms represented
in the AICPA membership as o f April 19, 1983.6 The table shows that 44,063
AICPA members, or 43 percent o f the 102,539 AICPA members in public
practice, were associated with the 1,718 member firms. Firms not in the division
are primarily sole practitioners and firms with less than eleven AICPA members.
Division membership represents about one-third o f firms with six to ten AICPA
members; just over one-half o f firms with eleven to twenty-five members; and
84 percent of larger firms, including 100 percent o f firms with one hundred or
more members. Almost all SECPS member firms are also members o f the PCPS.
Table 2 on pages 50—51 contains an analysis o f membership in the SECPS
from March 31, 1979 to December 31, 1983. It shows that there were 439
member firms at December 31, 1983, o f which 240 had no SEC clients. Although
the number o f member firms has declined from the high reached in 1980, the
number o f SEC clients audited by member firms and the number o f professionals
in member firms have increased over the years as follows.

Date

Member
Firms

SEC
Clients

Professionals

3/31/79
3/31/80
3/31/81
6/30/82
6/30/83
12/31/83

550
574
515
428
426
439

8,621
8,880
8,946
9,618
10,147
10,463

72,603
72,500
76,813
79,548
83,925
84,671

6. The table is from AICPA, PCPS—Achievements and Prospects, Report of the Special Committee
to Study the Objectives, Policies, and Procedures of the Private Companies Practice Section (New
York: AICPA, 1984), p. 12.

49

Table 2
SEC Practice Section
Analysis of Membership
March 31, 1979 to December 31, 1983

Number of Member Firms

March 31, 1979
1979-1980
Mergers
New members
Resignations
Terminations
Reclassifications
March 31, 1980
1980-81
Mergers
New members
Resignations
Terminations
Reclassifications
March 31, 1981
1981-82
Mergers
New members
Resignations
Terminations
Reclassifications
June 30, 1982
1982-83 (to 6/30/83)
Mergers
New members
Resignations
Terminations
Reclassifications
June 30, 1983
1983 (to 12/31/83)
Mergers
New members
Resignations
Terminations
Reclassifications
December 31, 1983

Totals

Without
SEC
Clients

With
SEC
Clients

550

339

211

(4)
140
(112)

(2)
77
(88)

(2)
63
(24)
__

—

—

—

—

—

574

329

245

0)
75
(109)
(18)

(3)
47
(75)
(13)
5
290

(4)
28
(34)
(5)
225

(1)
19
(56)
(18)
1 1
223

(5)
11
(31)
(6)
11
205

(6)
41
(28)
(1)

(7)
12
(13)

—

515
(6)
30
(87)
(24)
—

428
(13)
53
(41)
(1)

—
—

426

229

(6)
32
(13)

(3)
24
(6)

—
—

439

197

—

(

4)
240

(3)
8
(7)
—

4
199

Note: Data for the period from March 31, 1979 to Ju n e 30, 1983 are taken from the annual repo rts
o f the POB. Data for the six m onths ended December 31, 1983, are taken from the SECPS’s
records. New mem bers and resignations include PCPS members who changed to the SECPS and
SECPS members who changed to the PCPS.
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Total Changes
March 31, 1979 to December 31, 1983

Number of Member Firms

March 31, 1979
Mergers
New Members
Resignations
Terminations
Reclassifications
December 31, 1983

Totals

Without
SEC
Clients

With
SEC
Clients

550
(36)
330
(362)
(43)
—
439

339
(15)
208
(253)
(32)
( 7)
240

211
(21)
122
(109)
(11)
7
199

One-third of the decline of 111 firms in the total membership of the section
is the result o f mergers among member firms. Membership o f firms with one
or more SEC clients has declined by only twelve firms and, if the twenty-one
mergers o f such firms during this period are considered, has increased by nine
firms.
Some firms that audit SEC clients have chosen to join only the PCPS. The
following is an analysis o f division membership as of June 30, 1983 by number
o f SEC clients.
SECPS
PCPS Only
Total
Classification
5 or more SEC Clients
Less than 5
None
Totals

43
154
229
426

3
116
U 40
1,259

46
270
1,369
1,685

The POB’s 1982—83 annual report shows that a very substantial proportion
o f publicly traded companies, including all of the larger ones, are audited by
firms that are members of the division. The following is an analysis of the data
compiled by the POB from Who Audits America.7
SEC Registrants
Percent
Audited by
197 SECPS firms
119 PCPS firms
316 Division members

Number
7,224
148
7,372

Sales
(Billions)

Number

Sales

$3,660

85%

99%

____ 2

2%
87%

99%

$3,662

7. Data Financial Press, Who Audits America, 9th ed. (Menlo Park, California: Data Financial
Press, 1982).
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The analysis shows that 197 SECPS member firms audit the financial statements
o f 85 percent o f those publicly traded companies and that the combined sales
volume o f those companies accounted for 99 percent o f the total for all such
companies. Although 1,142 publicly traded companies are audited by firms that
are not members o f the division, those companies, taken as a whole, are relatively
insignificant in relation to the companies audited by division members. The
POB also reports that members of the division audit all but three o f the U.S.
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange and all but twenty-four of
those listed on the American Stock Exchange.

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
The activities o f the SECPS are governed by its executive committee, a senior
committee within the AICPA with the authority to conduct the activities of the
section to the extent that those activities do not conflict with the policies and
standards o f the Institute.
COMPOSITION AND SELECTION

The SECPS Executive Committee is composed o f representatives from twentyone member firms. Members of the committee are appointed for three-year
terms by the chairman of the Institute with the approval of the Institute’s Board
o f Directors and with the approval o f the existing executive committee. The
members o f the executive committee are selected by a nominating committee,
consisting o f seven persons drawn from seven SECPS member firms and elected
by the AICPA Council. The section’s organizational document requires that the
executive committee at all times include a representative from each member
firm that audits the financial statements o f thirty or more SEC registrants
(currently fourteen firms) and at least five representatives (currently seven)
from firms that audit the financial statements of fewer than thirty SEC registrants.
The number o f seats that are not permanent can never be less than five because
the organizational document requires that the size o f the committee be increased
by one for each permanent seat in excess of sixteen.
The chairman o f the executive committee is elected by the committee from
among its members and serves at the pleasure of the executive committee but
may not serve for more than three one-year terms.
RESPONSIBILITIES

The executive committee establishes general policies for the section and oversees
its activities. The committee’s responsibilities and functions include determining
membership requirements, establishing the section’s budget and the dues
necessary to finance its activities, dealing with complaints against members,
imposing sanctions on members, appointing committees and task forces, inter
acting with other AICPA boards and committees, and consulting with the POB.
AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS

The executive committee has the authority to impose sanctions on member
firms either on its own initiative or on the basis of recommendations o f the peer
review committee or the special investigations committee. Under the organiza
tional document o f the section, the types of sanctions that may be imposed on
member firms for failure to maintain compliance with the requirements for
membership include these seven.

52

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

Designation o f corrective measures to be taken by a firm, including
consideration by the firm of appropriate actions concerning individual
firm personnel.
Additional requirements for continuing professional education.
Accelerated or special peer reviews.
Admonishments, censures, or reprimands.
Monetary fines.
Suspension from membership.
Expulsion from membership.

In November 1979, when the special investigations committee was formed,
the executive committee established rules of procedure for the imposition of
sanctions. The rules are designed to assure due process to member firms in
proceedings related to the imposition of sanctions. The executive committee,
thus far, has imposed no formal sanctions and has received no recommendations
from the peer review committee or the special investigations committee to do
so. However, actions taken voluntarily by member firms can, in some instances,
have the effect of sanctions. Those are the actions taken pursuant to decisions
o f the peer review committee or the special investigations committee in the peer
review program and the investigative process, or in response to requests by the
executive committee to comply with membership requirements. Information on
those types o f actions is usually included in a member firm’s public file but is
not otherwise publicized.

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

The executive committee generally meets quarterly, usually for one day, but
may hold special meetings when needed. The chairmen of the peer review
committee and o f the special investigations committee attend executive committee
meetings periodically and report on their activities. The staff o f the POB attends
all meetings of the executive committee and the meetings of all other SECPS
committees and task forces. FOB members also often attend those meetings to
observe the process and to discuss matters o f current concern to the FOB.
The executive committee has a planning committee to assist the chairman in
carrying out his responsibilities. The planning committee consists o f the chairman
and five members of the committee appointed by the chairman. It usually meets
at least quarterly about three weeks before an executive committee meeting and
at other times as needed. The planning committee discusses matters of current
concern and may act for the executive committee when it is not feasible or
necessary to convene the full committee to consider a particular matter.
The executive committee also may appoint task forces or subcommittees to
address specific issues. For example, the executive committee established a task
force in 1979 to conduct a study of aspects of the auditor’s work environment.
That task force prepared a position paper addressing those matters, which was
distributed to the members of the section. Another task force established in
1981 studied the continuing appropriateness of the section’s membership
requirements and recommended changes, many of which the executive com
mittee adopted. On occasion, the executive committee has also established joint
task forces with the PCPS executive committee to deal with matters of common
interest to the two sections, such as the publication of the membership directory
for the division.
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PEER REVIEW PROGRAM
Peer review is the centerpiece o f the section’s program of self-regulation.
Member firms are required to undergo reviews conducted by other practitioners
(peer reviews) at least every three years. The program is designed to determine
whether member firms are complying with quality control standards in their
accounting and audit practices and with the other membership requirements.
The SECPS Peer Review Committee with the support of the staff o f the AICPA
Quality Control Review Division (QCRD) is responsible for administering the
program.
PEER REVIEW COMMITTEE

The SECPS Peer Review Committee is a permanent standing committee with
fifteen members. The members, including the chairman, are appointed from
member firms by the executive committee. The peer review committee is
responsible for administering the peer review program and establishing stand
ards for peer reviews. Its responsibilities also include making recommendations
to the executive committee on sanctions and other disciplinary decisions,
consulting with the POB, and maintaining records of peer reviews conducted.
A similarly structured committee, the PCPS Peer Review Committee, performs
the same functions for members of the PCPS with the support of the QCRD.
STANDARDS FOR PEER REVIEWS

The standards for conducting and reporting on peer reviews, first published in
1978—79 and periodically updated, are contained in each section’s peer review
manual. In conjunction with those manuals, each section publishes a loose-leaf
binder, which includes all required peer review forms, checklists and instructions,
and recent amendments and interpretations of the standards and administrative
procedures. Amendments and interpretations of standards require the written
approval of two-thirds of the members of the peer review committee.
TYPES OF PEER REVIEWS

Members o f either section of the Division for CPA Firms may elect to undergo
peer reviews of the following types:
1.

Committee-appointed review team (CART) review, a review conducted by a
team appointed by the respective peer review committee.
2. Firm-on-firm review, a review conducted by another member firm.
3. Association-sponsored review, a review administered under an authorized
program o f an association o f CPA firms.
4. State society-sponsored review, a review administered under an authorized
program o f a state society of CPAs.
SECPS and PCPS peer reviews are structured essentially the same for all types
o f reviews. They are administered by the same staff, the QCRD, under standards
that are substantively the same, frequently using the same peer reviewers. The
peer review committees o f the two sections operate in substantially the same
manner and cooperate in developing standards and procedures for peer reviews.
However, SECPS peer reviews are conducted under POB oversight and are
closely monitored by the POB and its staff.
The SECPS peer review program originally required the use of quality control
review panels, a select panel of professionals appointed by the peer review
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committee to evaluate the work of peer reviewers, for firm-on-firm reviews and
for reviews administered by associations o f CPA firms or under an authorized
program o f a state society o f CPAs. The SECPS eliminated the use o f such
panels in 1982, based on a recommendation of the POB.
The quality control systems of member firms usually differ based on their
size and type o f practice. Accordingly, a peer review is tailored to the size and
type o f practice o f a particular firm. Both sections have published peer review
guidelines for—
•
•
•
•

Sole practitioners without full-time professional staff.
Firms with generally two to twenty professionals.
Firms with generally twenty to fifty professionals.
Firms with generally over fifty professionals.

REPORTS AND REMEDIAL ACTIONS

Peer reviewers are required to issue a report on each peer review conducted
and, if applicable, a letter of comment on matters that may require action by
the firm. The report may be unqualified, qualified, or adverse. Letters of
comment have been issued as a result of most peer reviews to identify matters
relating to a firm’s quality controls that require the firm’s attention. The reviewed
firm is required to prepare a written response to a letter of comment describing
the actions it has taken or plans to take.
On each peer review, the peer review committee considers the report, the
letter of comment, if any, and the firm’s response to the letter o f comment.
Based on the nature and extent o f the review team’s findings, the peer review
committee may decide to accept the report and the related documents only if
the firm agrees to meet certain conditions. Such conditions may include
accelerated or special peer reviews, revisit by a peer reviewer, additional CPF
requirements, or other steps to provide reasonable assurance that the firm has
remedied the deficiencies noted. The committee does this, instead of recom
mending the imposition o f sanctions, because it believes that placing emphasis
on corrective measures for identified deficiencies is ordinarily the best way to
achieve the section’s objectives o f improving the quality o f practice and main
taining an effective system of self-regulation.
The public file of an SECPS member firm that has undergone a peer review
includes, among other things, the peer review report, the letter of comment, if
any, the firm’s response, the letter to the firm communicating acceptance and
indicating corrective actions required, if any, and other documents pertaining
to corrective action.

POB MONITORING OF THE PROGRAM

The POB monitors and evaluates both the program as a whole and individual
peer reviews. Its work involves observing reviews in process on all firms with
five or more SEC clients and other reviews on a selected basis and attending
meetings o f the SECPS Peer Review Committee and o f its subcommittees and
task forces. The POB’s comments, suggestions, or reservations about the program
as a whole or about individual peer reviews are discussed with the committee.
The QCRD communicates frequently with the POB’s staff. It provides
information on scheduling arrangements and changes in such arrangements,
sends copies o f the peer review reports and related documents to the POB
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when a peer review is completed, and responds to inquiries by the POB’s staff
concerning peer review reports or working papers.
The POB evaluates the effectiveness of the peer review program in its annual
reports.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROGRAM

In carrying out its responsibility to maintain an effective system of self-regulation
through the peer review program, the peer review committee meets approxi
mately five times a year. The QCRD provides all necessary staff support, takes
care o f the day-to-day administration o f the program, and reports all significant
unusual matters to the committee. The peer review committee evaluates peer
review reports, monitors the corrective actions taken by firms, takes initiatives
to make sure that the program as a whole remains effective, and maintains
overall supervision o f staff activities. The bulk of the administrative work consists
of maintaining a data bank of qualified peer reviewers, scheduling reviews,
consulting with reviewers and reviewed firms, and monitoring the progress of
reviews through completion and acceptance by the committee.

Data bank of peer reviewers. Annually, the QCRD asks member firms to
nominate accounting and audit partners and managers for service on review
teams. Persons nominated are required to submit profiles indicating, among
other things, the extent and areas of their experience, their past participation
in peer reviews, and their availability. The information on prospective reviewers
is included in a reviewer data bank, from which reviewers for CART reviews
are selected.
Scheduling reviews. Each year, the QCRD asks firms required to undergo peer
reviews during the year to submit general background and scheduling infor
mation. If a firm elects to have a CART review, the QCRD, using the information
supplied by the firm, selects a review team and a team captain by searching the
reviewer data bank. When the peer review team has been accepted by the firm
undergoing review, an engagement letter is drafted. The engagement letter sets
forth, among other things, the scheduled timing of the review, the names and
firms of the reviewers, the hours budgeted for the review, and the reviewers’
rates. Also, the QCRD staff mails to the team captain the forms, checklists, and
instructions needed to assist in the review.
For other forms of reviews, the QCRD reviews the arrangements with the
firms to determine whether the reviewers meet the qualifications for conducting
peer reviews. In some instances, based on criteria established by the peer review
committee, a committee member may conduct an on-site review o f the reviewers’
work.
The QCRD maintains files on scheduling information relating to all types of
reviews and monitors the scheduling to make sure that all member firms undergo
timely reviews.
Consulting with reviewers and reviewed firms. The QCRD staff helps resolve
numerous questions that arise in connection with scheduling and conducting
reviews. In addition, reviewers are required to consult with the QCRD staff in
specified circumstances, for example, when a modified report is being considered
or when no letter o f comment is expected to be issued. The staff documents
responses to major questions and maintains a subject file on responses to assure
consistency in the advice given.
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Monitoring performance and completion. The QCRD staff regularly monitors
the work o f peer reviewers to assure that the reviewers complete their work
and submit the required materials on time. A policy adopted by both sections
in 1982 requires the QCRD to report regularly to the peer review committee
chairman on all instances in which reviewers or reviewed firms do not complete
their work on time. Based on discussions with the appropriate parties, the
QCRD staff attempts to determine the reason for the delay and to estimate the
completion date. The full peer review committee is informed of missed deadlines
at its regular meetings and evaluates whether to refer the matter to the
professional ethics division (if the problem is attributable to the reviewer) or to
hold hearings to determine whether to recommend sanctions against reviewed
firms.
When a review has been completed, the QCRD staff reviews the peer review
report, the letter of comment, and the firm’s response. The QCRD staff also
reviews the working papers on a CART review and at least the summary review
memorandum on all other reviews. Staff reviews, which are made following
guidelines approved by the peer review committee, and the staff s findings are
reported to the peer review evaluation subcommittee for its consideration.
Consideration of reports. Copies of every peer review report, letter of comment,
firm response, and related matters are sent to the peer review committee’s
evaluation subcommittee. Based on reviews of those documents and consider
ation of the staff's findings, the subcommittee decides whether to recommend
to the full committee acceptance of the reports or whether any further action
is necessary by the reviewed firms, the reviewers, or the committee. The
subcommittee discusses its recommendations with the full committee, which
ratifies or revises them. The QCRD staff notifies the firm of the acceptance of
the report and o f any conditions specified by the committee. At each subsequent
committee meeting, the staff reports on the status of those actions until the
matter is resolved.

Records of peer reviews. The QCRD maintains records on peer reviews
conducted. The files contain documentation of scheduling, administrative,
review, and acceptance procedures. In addition, computerized records are kept
on all member firms, including admission date, date of the last peer review,
and the due date o f the next peer review. Current statistics are maintained on
the number o f member firms by review year and the total number and type of
peer review reports accepted by the peer review committee. To assist the
committee in evaluating the possible implications for the peer review process,
an analysis o f modified reports accepted by the committee is also maintained.
Consultations. Questions regarding peer reviews are directed to the QCRD by
member firms and by peer reviewers. The QCRD staff is responsible for
answering those questions. As necessary, the staff consults with the AICPA’s
vice president-technical, the committee chairman, the Technical Information
Services Division, and the POB and its staff. If the issue involves a potential
change in peer review standards or practice, the matter is brought to the
attention of the full committee.
PEER REVIEW RESULTS

Based on the information in the POB’s 1982—83 annual report as updated to
December 31, 1983, the following is a summary of the types of peer review
reports issued and the types of actions required by the peer review committee
over the first five years o f the program.
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Type o f
Report
Unqualified
Qualified
Adverse

Actions Required by PRC*

Number
of
Reviews
433
64
13
510

Accelerated
Reviews
—

13
12

25

No
Action

Revisits

Other

6
17
10

4
4
6

424
41

14

465

3

—

* Note; The total number of actions (72) plus the total number not requiring action (465)
exceeds the total number of reviews (510) because a number of firms were required to take
more than one type of action.

The deficiencies identified in the qualified or adverse reports involved designated
areas o f quality control, such as supervision, inspection, consultation, independ
ence, and advancement. Other areas identified included noncompliance with
other membership requirements such as concurring partner review, continuing
professional education, and liability insurance. In all o f those instances, firms
agreed to take the required corrective actions.
The peer review process has also identified substandard performance—
instances o f failures to comply with generally accepted accounting principles
(the body of technical standards governing the preparation and presentation of
financial statements) or generally accepted auditing standards (the body o f
technical standards governing the performance o f an audit by a CPA)—on
individual engagements. The POB reports that 61, or 3.2 percent, of the 1,919
engagements reviewed in 1981 and 1982 were deemed to be substandard. In
connection with those engagements the firms took the following corrective
actions.
Audit report recalled and financial statements revised and
reissued
14
Omitted auditing procedures performed
7
Cause o f impairment o f independence eliminated
3
GAAP or GAAS deficiencies not requiring immediate action
corrected in subsequent year’s audit
Total
61

RESULTS OF OVERSIGHT

The scope o f the POB’s oversight of the peer review program for 1983 is shown
in the following table.
Type o f POB Oversight
Number o f SEC
Registrants
Audited by Firm
30 or more
10 to 29
5 to 9
1 to 4
None
Totals
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Total
Number
of Firms

VisitationObserva
tion

11
6
8
59
60
144

11
6
8
11
4
40

Working-Paper
Review

Report
Review

29
22

19
34

The SEC, through an arrangement that gives it limited access to peer review
working papers, evaluates the effectiveness o f the process and of the POB’s
oversight o f the process. The SEC stated in its 1982 report to Congress on its
oversight of the accounting profession that
Under the terms of an “access” arrangement agreed to by the SECPS and the
Commission, for the first time the Commission’s staff reviewed a sample of the
working papers underlying reviews. Based on this review and the staff's review of
the POB’s oversight files, the Commission has determined that it can rely to a great
extent on the POB’s oversight function in fulfilling its own responsibilities. Never
theless, the Commission will continue to monitor the peer review process by reviewing
certain working papers pursuant to the access arrangement so that it can periodically
evaluate this important self-regulatory initiative and the need for refinements in the
process as a result of changing professional, economic, and regulatory conditions.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE
The SECPS Special Investigations Committee was established to consider the
implications of alleged audit failures o f member firms relating to a case in
litigation. The need to establish investigative and disciplinary procedures for
alleged or possible audit failures was among the earliest matters involving
consultation between the executive committee and the POB. The decision was
made that the protection of users of audited financial statements should be the
dominant consideration. Alleged audit failures may raise questions about the
adequacy o f auditing standards and procedures, the quality controls o f the
member firms, or perhaps the firms’ offices responsible for the audits. The
POB concurred in the SECPS’s decision to establish a permanent committee to
monitor and to determine actions that should be taken concerning alleged or
possible audit failures involving member firms, and the executive committee
established the special investigations committee in November 1979 to serve that
purpose.
OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMITTEE

The special investigations committee was established in recognition of the
significant public interest in matters concerning the practice o f public accounting
that have a bearing on the reliability of financial statements of SEC registrants.
Its principal concerns relate to the adequacy of generally accepted auditing
standards and quality control standards and to the compliance by member firms
with those standards in the conduct of their accounting and audit practices.
According to its organizational document, these are its primary objectives.•
•

•

•

Assist in providing reasonable assurance to the public and to the
profession that member firms are complying with professional standards
in the conduct of their practice before the Securities and Exchange
Commission by identifying corrective measures, if any, that should be
taken by a member firm involved in a specific alleged audit failure.
Assist in improving the quality o f practice by member firms before the
Securities and Exchange Commission by determining whether facts
relating to specific alleged audit failures indicate that changes in generally
accepted auditing standards or quality control standards need to be
considered.
Recommend to the executive committee, when deemed necessary,
appropriate sanctions on the member firms involved.
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The committee considers the implications of cases while litigation is still in
process. Therefore, its inquiries begin as soon as it becomes aware of an alleged
audit failure and it usually concludes its work long before litigation comes to
an end.
COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE

The special investigations committee consists o f nine active or retired partners
o f member firms, no more than one from any firm. The members o f the
committee, including its chairman, are appointed by the executive committee.
They are appointed for a three-year term and may be reappointed to serve for
three additional one-year terms. They are not permitted to serve concurrently
on either the executive committee or the peer review committee. They may not
participate in deliberations involving their firms; they also are excluded from
deliberations on matters involving other firms if they have, or believe they have,
a conflict of interest. For example, a committee member is deemed to have a
conflict of interest in a matter if the committee member’s firm conducted the
most recent peer review o f the firm under investigation. For the purpose o f the
conflict o f interest rules, retired partners are treated the same as active partners
for three years following their retirement.
The committee currently consists of five retired partners and four active
partners. The two chairmen to date have been active partners, although that is
not required.
MEMBER FIRMS’ REPORTING REQUIREMENT

To enable the committee to carry out its functions, SECPS member firms are
required to report to the committee certain litigation, proceedings, or investi
gations involving the firm or its personnel. Reportable actions are generally
limited to those that allege audit or reporting deficiencies relating to a firm’s
SEC clients in connection with filings under the federal securities laws. Section
IV.3(m) o f the SECPS’s organizational document requires member firms to
Report to the special investigations committee, within thirty days of service on the
firm or its personnel of the first pleading in the matter or within thirty days of
joining the section, if later, any litigation (including criminal indictments) against it
or its personnel, or any proceeding or investigation publicly announced by a
regulatory agency, commenced on or after November 1, 1979 (not including
additional proceedings arising out of or related to facts involved in litigation origi
nally filed prior to November 1, 1979), that involves clients or former clients that
are SEC registrants and that alleges deficiencies in the conduct of an audit or
reporting thereon in connection with any required filing under the federal securities
laws. With respect to matters previously reported under this subparagraph, member
firms shall report to the committee additional proceedings, settlements, court
decisions on substantive issues, and the filing of appeals within thirty days of their
occurrence.

The requirement is amplified by a footnote that requires reporting of all cases
involving an allegation that a member firm or its personnel violated federal
securities laws. The footnote states:
An allegation in such formal litigation, proceeding, or investigation that a member
firm or its personnel have violated the federal securities laws in connection with
services other than an audit for an SEC registrant shall be reported.

The staff o f the committee monitors SEC releases and various business and
financial publications to assure that firms comply with the reporting requirement.
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The staff also brings to the attention of the committee publicized litigation that
does not involve SEC registrants. From time to time, when it deems it necessary
to do so in the public interest, the special investigations committee requests
firms to voluntarily report matters that are outside the scope of the reporting
requirement. All such requests have been complied with.
OPERATIONS

The special investigations committee operates under procedures and guidelines
approved by the executive committee. (The discussion of the structure and
authority of the special investigations committee in the body of this report
[pages 30-32] contains additional information on its modes of operation.) The
committee’s organizational document provides that its activities involve four
modes: screening, monitoring, investigation of a firm, and investigation of a
case. Activities and decisions in the four modes consist o f the activities and
possible decisions shown in the figure below.

Activities
Screening—A procedure initiated when
a case is reported and generally com
pleted within ninety days in which
the nature and implications of alle
gations, findings of the latest peer
review, and other relevant informa
tion is reviewed to determine what
further action should be taken, if any.
Monitoring—A procedure for holding
open a case not resolved in the screen
ing phase pending receipt of infor
mation, such as future financial state
ments, the results of a peer review,
or a report by a bankruptcy trustee.
Investigation of a Firm—A procedure
involving a special review by a com
mittee-appointed task force or the
firm’s peer reviewers, of specific of
fices, functions, industry practice seg
ments, people, policies, or procedures
to evaluate whether the firm needs to
take corrective actions.
Investigation of a Case—A procedure
involving an examination o f the al
legations in a specific case by refer
ence to the working papers or other
direct evidence. This may be under
taken only after obtaining the ap
proval of the executive committee.

Possible Decisions
Close the case.
Monitor developments.
Investigate the firm.
Follow up to assure that appro
priate corrective actions have been
taken.
Close the case.
Investigate the firm.
Follow up to assure that appro
priate corrective actions have been
taken.
Close the case.
Follow up to assure that appro
priate corrective actions have been
taken.
Recommend sanctions when ap
propriate corrective actions have
not been taken.
Such an investigation has not been
considered to be feasible for the
reasons stated elsewhere in this
report.

When a matter is reported to the special investigations committee, it begins
its consideration by screening the available information. Screening procedures
usually include the following:
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•

•
•

•

All committee members receive and review copies of the original
complaint, any consolidated amended complaints, and a case summary
prepared by the staff.
The chairman assigns one or two members to handle the matter.
Assigned committee members receive and review copies o f relevant
financial statements and SEC filings and other documents within the
public domain, such as bankruptcy trustee reports.
The assigned committee members review the firm’s most recent peer
review report, the peer review letter o f comment, and the firm’s response
to the letter o f comment.

If the committee is unable to dispose o f the case based on those steps, the
assigned members may—
•
•
•

Discuss the matter with representatives o f the firm and, if appropriate,
with the firm’s peer reviewer.
Review the working papers on the firm’s last peer review.
Review other information submitted by the firm, such as internal
inspection results.

At any point during the screening procedure, the committee may close its
files on a case, either because the case appears to lack merit or because no
corrective actions are necessary or have already been taken by the firm. If the
committee is not prepared to close the case on the basis o f its screening
procedures but not convinced that an investigation of the firm or o f the case is
needed, it will usually hold the case open to monitor further developments.
At any point during screening or monitoring, the committee may decide that
an investigation o f the firm is required. An investigation of the firm is, generally
speaking, a special peer review that is focused on a specific area o f practice, a
particular office or offices, designated personnel, or specified quality control
policies and procedures. Such investigations have been conducted by firms’ peer
reviewers and by a special task force o f the committee. However performed, a
special peer review is conducted under the personal direction o f the assigned
committee members. Before an investigation of a firm is authorized, the firm
has the right to present its arguments on why an investigation may be unnecessary
at a meeting of the full committee.
The investigation o f the auditor’s working papers and other relevant evidence
in a specific case while litigation is in process has not been considered to be
feasible for reasons stated on pages 30—32 o f this report. There is little need
for such investigation after the conclusion of litigation, since corrective actions,
if required, should already have been taken. In discussing the practical limitations
affecting the investigation o f specific cases, the POB’s 1982-83 annual report
stated that
Certain practical limitations affect the committee’s ability to conduct an investigation
of a specific alleged failure. In fact, the capacity of the committee to conduct an
investigation is far more limited than that of private litigants or the SEC. For
example, it cannot take testimony of witnesses under oath and it cannot subpoena
documents or witnesses. It must rely on the willingness of the audit firm to supply
evidence. Hence, were it to pass judgm ent on a firm or an individual in connection
with an alleged audit failure, it would not have as firm a basis for that judgm ent as
would the SEC or a court. The danger of an unfair result would be significant.
Compounding the problem is the fact that private litigants might then use this
conclusion, founded on an insufficient record, as evidence in civil litigation.
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Since the primary objective of the special investigative process is preventive and not
punitive, the committee can accomplish its objective effectively by conducting an
investigation of the firm’s quality control system without the risks inherent in an
investigation of the specific alleged audit failure.
The Board believes that the special investigative process has no need to duplicate
the work of the SEC or the civil courts. Rather, the committee’s responsibility is (1)
to determine whether charges in litigation or other proceedings involving audit
performance indicate that there are insufficiencies in auditing standards or the
quality controls of the auditing firm that require remedial action and (2) to ascertain
that such remedial action is taken so that whatever gave rise to the charges should
not again be the source of problems.

The rules of the special investigations committee require that it conduct its
affairs in privacy on a strictly confidential basis. Privacy and confidentiality are
deemed essential to allow the committee to operate effectively and to avoid
prejudicing a member firm while litigation is in process. However, the executive
committee may authorize public disclosure of information on any investigation
or sanction. The POB has access to the files and proceedings of the committee
on a confidential basis and is authorized, after hearing the views of a firm and
after consultation with the executive committee, to make public disclosure of
information it deems necessary in the interest of the profession and the public.
RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS

Since the inception of the committee in 1979 through December 31, 1983, the
committee placed eighty-two cases on its agenda. O f those cases, seventy-five
were reported by firms pursuant to the membership requirement to report
specific matters and seven were voluntarily reported after the committee received
information from other sources and asked the firms to do so. The status of
those cases at December 31, 1983, was as follows:
Cases closed:
After screening or monitoring
After investigation of the firm
Cases open:
Being screened
Being monitored
Investigation of firm in process
Total

62
3
65
12
3
2
17
82

THE PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
The POB is an important structural feature of the program o f self-regulation—
an independent, institutional representation o f the public interest.
ORGANIZATION, COMPOSITION, AND STRUCTURE

The SECPS’s organizational document requires a public oversight board con
sisting o f five members “drawn from among prominent individuals of high
integrity and reputation, including, but not limited to, former public officials,
lawyers, bankers, securities industry executives, educators, economists, and
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business executives.” The POB was formed early in 1978 and held its first
meeting in March, 1978. The initial members o f the POB, appointed by the
executive committee with the approval of the AICPA Board o f Directors, were:
John J. McCloy, Chairman
Ray Garrett, Jr., Vice Chairman
William L. Cary

John D. Harper
Arthur M. Wood

Mr. McCloy, who served with distinction as chairman from the board’s
inception until 1984, served as the assistant secretary o f war from 1941 to 1945,
the United States military governor and high commissioner for Germany from
1949 to 1952, the chairman o f the board o f directors o f the Chase Manhattan
Bank from 1955 to 1960 and is a member o f the New York City law firm of
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy. He was reelected chairman for a threeyear term ending in December, 1986 but resigned early in 1984 for personal
reasons. Mr. Garrett, who served as vice chairman until his death in February
1980, was the chairman of the SEC from 1973 to 1975 and thereafter a member
of the Chicago law firm o f Gardner, Carton 8c Douglas. Mr. Cary, who resigned
from the board in 1982 for reasons o f ill health, was the chairman o f the SEC
from 1961 to 1964 and the Dwight Professor of Law at Columbia University
until his death in 1982. Mr. Harper, whose present term ends in 1985, is the
former chairman o f the board o f directors and chief executive officer o f
Aluminum Company of America. Mr. Wood, whose present term ends in 1985
and who was appointed vice chairman in 1982 and chairman in 1984, is the
former chairman o f the board o f directors and chief executive officer of Sears,
Roebuck and Co.
To fill the vacancy created by the death o f Ray Garrett, Jr., Robert K. Mautz
was appointed in 1981. Mr. Mautz, who has spent most o f his career as an
educator and as a researcher, has been the director since 1978 of the Paton
Accounting Center at the University o f Michigan and is a former member o f
the federal government’s Cost Accounting Standards Board. To fill the vacancy
created by the resignation o f William L. Cary, A. A. Sommer, Jr. was appointed
to the board in 1983. Mr. Sommer is a former SEC commissioner and is a
member of the Washington, D.C. law firm of Morgan, Lewis 8c Bockius.
The board has a full-time staff of six people, consisting o f four CPAs, an
administrative assistant, and a secretary. Louis W. Matusiak, a former partner
in the CPA firm of Alexander Grant & Company, has served as executive
director since 1978 and as executive director and secretary since 1982. Richard
A. Stark, a member o f the New York City law firm o f Milbank, Tweed, Hadley
8c McCloy, who initially served as secretary to the board and as an assistant to
Mr. McCloy, now serves as legal counsel to the board. The board also engages
recently retired partners o f CPA firms to assist the permanent staff when
required.
Following its formation, the POB recommended, and the AICPA adopted, a
change in the SECPS’s organizational document to provide a higher degree o f
independence from the section and from the Institute. The change provides
that following its initial appointment, the POB has the authority to appoint,
remove, and set the terms and compensation of its members and select its
chairman, with the limitation that its members are appointed in consultation
with and subject to approval o f the AICPA Board o f Directors. The POB’s
bylaws established staggered three-year terms for its members, with a provision
that a member may be appointed for successive terms without limit. The bylaws
also established the procedures for the conduct o f meetings and the operations
o f the POB.
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The POB was established as an oversight body without line authority over
the section. In an early decision o f the board, it concurred that it should not
have such authority. The board believes that its oversight function is best
exercised without the authority to compel compliance with its views or to
overrule the executive committee on decisions contrary to its views. The board
believes that its ability to offer objective comments and criticisms is enhanced
by not being a formal part of the structure for planning and executing policy
decisions o f the SECPS. The board’s opinion is that its ability to comment
publicly on matters regarding the accounting profession provides sufficient
power to discharge its oversight responsibilities.
All expenses o f the POB and its staff are paid from SECPS membership dues.
The board has fixed the annual remuneration o f its members at $50,000 for
the chairman, $40,000 for the vice chairman, and $30,000 for other members.
The following tabulation shows the annual expenses of the board reported since
its inception.
Year
Ending

Amount

July 31, 1979
July 31, 1980
June 30, 1981
June 30, 1982
July 31, 1983

$617,617
589,824
691,300
758,400
865,600

RESPONSIBILITIES

The POB has broad oversight responsibilities. As stated in the SECPS’s orga
nizational document, the POB’s responsibilities and functions are the following.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Monitor and evaluate the regulatory and sanction activities of the peer
review and executive committees to assure their effectiveness.
Determine that the peer review committee is ascertaining that firms are
taking appropriate action as a result o f peer reviews.
Conduct continuing oversight o f all other activities o f the section.
Make recommendations to the executive committee for improvements
in the operation o f the section.
Publish an annual report and such other reports as may be deemed
necessary with respect to its activities.
Engage staff to assist in carrying out its functions.
Have the right for any or all o f its members to attend any meetings o f
the executive committee.

MONITORING THE PEER REVIEW PROGRAM

A major responsibility o f the POB is to monitor and evaluate the activities of
the peer review committee, the peer reviews o f member firms, and the actions
taken by the SECPS as a result o f peer reviews. The board uses its permanent
and part-time staff in the monitoring activity. Board representatives are required
to assess the appropriateness of the conduct of the reviews and the reports
issued and to challenge any that may not conform with peer review standards.
The procedures used in monitoring reviews include a visitation-observation
program, a working-paper review program, and a report review program.
Visitation-observation consists o f an examination o f working papers and reports
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prepared by reviewers and of visits to one or more offices of the reviewed firm
during the performance of the review. Visitations are made primarily by staff
members with selected attendance by board members. Working paper reviews
consist o f examinations o f working papers, reports and letters of comment
prepared by the reviewers, and the responses of the reviewed firms. Report
reviews are generally limited to a reading o f the reviewer’s summary memoran
dum, the peer review report, the letter of comment, if any, and the firm’s
response.
The POB requires some form of monitoring by its staff o f all peer reviews
o f SECPS member firms. The visitation-observation program is used on reviews
o f all firms with five or more SEC clients and, on a random sample basis, a
number o f other reviews o f firms with fewer than five SEC clients and a
representative number o f reviews o f firms with no SEC clients. The visitationobservation program or working-paper review program is used for subsequent
reviews o f firms that receive modified reports indicating a deficiency in their
quality control systems. The number o f peer reviews monitored in 1982 and
the types o f monitoring are shown under the discussion of the peer review
program.
MONITORING TH E INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS

The FOB was consulted and approved the formation o f the special investigations
committee. The FOB monitors the activities of that committee in depth. The
Po b ’s staff attends all meetings o f the special investigations committee. Board
members attend some o f those meetings. The FOB and its staff have complete
access to all committee files and actively monitor the committee’s decisions on
individual cases. The FOB’s staff reads the pertinent court documents, financial
information, and correspondence related to reported cases, and attends, at its
discretion, meetings between firm representatives and committee members. The
staff also reviews the committee’s working papers on all investigations. As
indicated in the discussion o f the special investigations committee, the board
reports on the results o f its monitoring activities in its annual reports.
MEETINGS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES

The FOB normally meets monthly and may hold other meetings as necessary.
At each meeting the board receives reports from its staff on the activities o f the
components o f the SECPS. The board conducted public hearings in connection
with its study on the scope o f services, and members of the board have testified
before Congressional committees, published articles on the SECPS, and made
public speeches. Board members and staff meet as needed with the commissioners
and staff o f the SEC.
REPORTING

The FOB issues an annual report, which reviews in depth the activities of the
SECPS. Five reports have been issued since the inception of the board. The
1982—83 report contains a comprehensive review o f the activities of the SECPS
during its first five years. The reports are widely distributed and serve as the
basis o f much o f the information on the SECPS that is now available to the
financial community.
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appendix B

SELF-REGULATION:
PERILS AND PROBLEMS
by ROBERT K. MAUTZ

Initially presented as Mr. Mautz’s views in a talk prepared for the American Institute of
CPAs tenth national conference on current SEC developments, this adaptation (reprinted
from the Journal o f Accountancy, May 1983) has since been reviewed by the public
oversight board (POB) of the SEC practice section of the AICPA division for CPA firms
and generally expresses the board’s sentiments. The POB oversees the self-regulatory efforts
of the SEC practice section. The conference was held in Washington, D.C., January 11
and 12, 1983.
Embarking on a program of self-regulation is anything but risk-free. An
important and perhaps unrecognized risk is the danger that expectations about
the program may not be met and that this could encourage unwise actions.
Unfulfilled expectations may result from inadequate performance o f the selfregulatory process or from unrealistic expectations. The profession’s experience,
to date, suggests that unrealistic expectations may be the greater danger.
Unrealistic expectations arise because critics of the self-regulatory process—
and even some participants—fail to recognize that—
•

•
•

Self-regulation is unavoidably limited in scope, operating within the
constraints imposed by an already existing and rigorous disciplinary
system.
Any regulatory activity, and self-regulation in particular, requires a
difficult balancing o f private rights and public good.
Self-regulation differs from public regulation in motivation, method
and purpose.

Robert K. Mautz, CPA, Ph.D., is a member of the public oversight board of the SEC practice
section of the American Institute of CPAs Division for CPA Firms and is director of the Paton
Accounting Center at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. A member of the Accounting
Hall of Fame, Dr. Mautz is a past president of the American Accounting Association and a
former editor of the Accounting Review; he also has served on the AICPA Council and Board
of Directors. In 1980 he was awarded the Gold Medal, the Institute’s highest honor.
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THE SCOPE OF REGULATION
If one considers regulation in the broadest sense, the complexity o f the total
process is overwhelming. It includes, on the one hand, such considerations as
the maintenance o f an economic and legal environment conducive to the
continued provision o f professional services for those who desire them and, on
the other hand, sufficient control o f conditions so that competition in the
provision o f those services does not fail and a monopoly does not emerge to
exploit society’s needs. It involves acceptance of the fact that the contracting
for and the performance o f services will from time to time result in misunder
standings or disagreements about the cost or quality of the services performed.
When this occurs, a system for adjudicating such disputes is needed, a system
that is recognized as both authoritative and equitable to all parties.
When members o f the public are unable to evaluate the quality of a service
because o f its technical nature, a licensing provision requiring practitioners to
meet established qualifications, perhaps including examination, may be appro
priate. In addition, standards o f performance must be established together with
some means o f reviewing that performance to protect the lay public from
substandard practice. Finally, on those relatively rare occasions when perform
ance deviates so far from the norm that sanctions are in order, the authority to
impose and enforce sanctions becomes a part of the regulatory process.
Given a fresh start and no limitations, one might invent a program o f self
regulation that includes all the activities described. To do so might be interesting,
but it would not be a very useful activity. Society has indicated no desire to free
accounting, or any other profession, from all o f the regulatory mechanisms now
in place. Agencies with far greater powers than any possessed by the accounting
profession police competition in the economy. An existing system of courts
settles civil disputes. Licensing powers are reserved for the states. A multiplicity
o f federal and local policing organizations are constantly on the alert for criminal
activity. The Securities and Exchange Commission has been assigned regulatory
responsibilities that it shows no sign o f relinquishing, and it couldn’t relinquish
these responsibilities even if it would.
Viewed realistically, self-regulation is but one element in a complex system
o f controls. Society entrusts to a self-regulating profession a limited set of
privileges, among them the right and responsibility to develop, establish, review
and refine standards o f professional performance. Society does so at least partly
because it believes the technical expertise and situational understanding of
members o f the profession qualify them to perform that role effectively. There
is no reason, nor has accounting the ability, to challenge the other participants
in the total regulatory structure. If accountants perform their role satisfactorily,
the tasks o f the others will all be eased. Accountants have a small niche in the
total regulatory process—but an important one.

PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY
Establishing and maintaining appropriate standards o f professional performance
demand a proper balance o f private rights and public responsibility. In a
perceptive article entitled “The Professions Under Siege” Jacques Barzun takes
note o f the diminishing status of the professions, including accounting, the
unavoidable conflict o f interest between members o f a profession and the lay
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public that uses its services, the vulnerability of the professions to public
displeasure and the real dangers o f public regulation.1
Professionals ask for special privileges, including the exclusion from practice
o f those who don’t qualify. In return for privileges, society demands superior
performance, high ethical behavior and very rare failures. Absent society’s
satisfaction, the profession’s privileges are endangered.
Balancing private rights and public responsibilities is a difficult matter indeed,
one Barzun contends is well beyond the scope o f codes and policing. In his
view, what is needed is a moral regeneration “which can come about only when
the members of a group feel once more confident that ethical behavior is
desirable, widely practiced, approved, and admired.’’2 To establish and maintain
such a condition should be part o f the goal o f self-regulation.
But how are such high-sounding goals to be achieved in the practical, downto-earth, highly competitive world o f accounting? Accomplishment is neither
easy nor impossible, but the problems involved are gaining increasing attention
in the profession where the spotlight has been focused on the American Institute
of CPAs division for CPA firms, which includes the SEC practice section (SECPS)
and the section’s public oversight board (POB).

PUBLIC REGULATION AND SELF-REGULATION
However similar their goals, public regulation and self-regulation have important
differences, not all o f which are immediately apparent. Public regulation is
conducted with the full power of the state in support of established requirements.
Self-regulation has no equivalent authority. At most, it can exclude noncomplying
members from whatever benefits group membership confers or impose whatever
sanctions members have voluntarily agreed to accept. Such powers as the ability
to subpoena records and witnesses are not available in self-regulation.
Public regulation is likely to emphasize punishment for transgressions; self
regulation will more likely emphasize remedies and the avoidance o f future
deficiencies. There are reasons for this. Public regulation is commonly employed
only when the community has become aroused by what it considers improper
conduct. The public wants that conduct stopped and finds punishment a useful
deterrent. Self-regulation, however, often has a strong concern for equity to
members o f the group, which must somehow be balanced with service to the
community. Members o f the group and the community are both served more
effectively by remedy than by punishment.
Self-regulatory processes accept the need for punishment in egregious cases,
but sanctions are likely to have a positive purpose—to be aimed at improved
service to society along with equitable treatment of the regulated. Public
regulation tends to view infractions as willful violations deserving punishment.
Self-regulation is concerned with establishing standards for proper conduct and
eliminating the causes o f unintentional and perhaps unrecognized failings as
well as the rate refusal to meet professional standards.
Finally, public regulation offers opportunities not available to those engaged
in self-regulation. Many a successful political career has been founded on the

1. Jacques Barzun, “The Professions Under Siege,” Harper’s (October 1978), pp. 61-68.
2. Ibid., p. 68.
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publicity and acclaim accorded a vigorous and resourceful prosecutor. Protecting
the public, putting the rascals away and battling the wrongdoers earns recog
nition, gratitude and higher public office. There is no equivalent opportunity
or reward in self-regulation.
Self-regulation, if it is justified at all, must rest on something more than the
self-interest o f those regulated. Generally, self-regulation is perceived as more
equitable than public regulation because the standards to be met are established
and enforced by fellow practitioners whose experience provides an understand
ing o f the environment, the risks, the pressures and the possibilities o f service
that laymen neither comprehend nor understand. Self-regulation, if performed
properly, also assures better service to the public because its emphasis is on
remedy and improvement and because it is in closer touch with practice, more
aware o f changing needs, and more responsive to the wants o f those who use
the service than any other form o f regulation can be.

SELF-REGULATION’S CHALLENGE
With this as background, let’s consider the problems faced in the establishment
and maintenance o f any system o f self-regulation. A major task o f those involved
in the process is one o f establishing mutual trust. Many members o f the regulated
group accept self-regulation with considerable reservation, and then they accept
it only because they consider it less undesirable than the public alternatives.
Few people seek regulation for its own sake. Professionals seem to find any
regulation particularly irksome, a slight to their professionalism and a potential
threat should it get out o f control.
Those who represent the public and have its best interests at heart are
concerned that entrusting regulation to members o f the profession is risky at
best. They fear that self-interest and pressure from colleagues will discourage
the establishment and maintenance o f adequate standards. In addition, within
the profession there will always be some who disagree with the self-regulatory
process, no matter how it is conducted, and either refuse to cooperate or
vigorously oppose what the majority o f the group has accepted. These disparate
views must somehow be brought together sufficiently to permit the program to
function.
Another difficulty is found in reforming the erroneous expectations enter
tained by some who confuse self-regulation with public regulation. Those who
have the point o f view o f public regulation expect a visibly impressive level of
activity. They want unequivocal evidence that the process is working effectively.
Without that evidence, they contend the process lacks credibility. In their minds,
public regulation is the model, and unless self-regulation emulates that model
it isn’t as effective as they believe it should be. When their expectations aren’t
met, they become critics o f the self-regulatory process.
At the other extreme are the expectations o f the group subject to self
regulation. Within that group will be some—often too many—who really expect
no change from their previously unregulated condition. They deny any need
for regulation and, at least in their own minds, contest the right of anyone,
even their professional colleagues, to impose requirements on them. Others will
accept regulation but only in those few cases in which there is great public
interest that demands action if the profession is to avoid severe censure. To
them, self-regulation means minimum interference with the status quo. Ob
viously, the expectations o f all these interests cannot be met.
Finally, and because of these disparate views, there is the very real problem
o f maintaining satisfactory relationships between those engaged in self-regulation
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and those who have been entrusted with an oversight responsibility and would
likely be charged with public regulation should the self-regulatory process not
succeed. If the latter do not perform their oversight responsibility, they fail
their own assignments. If they perform that oversight with excessive zeal, self
regulation is co-opted and becomes public regulation.

PROGRESS OF THE SECPS
Where is the profession now, insofar as the self-regulatory program for the
SECPS is concerned? In a relatively short period o f time, the section has made
remarkable strides. It has adopted an impressive set of quality control standards
and other requirements to be met by all members. A program of peer reviews
has been established, reviewers have been trained, reporting mechanisms have
been developed and a procedure by the peer review committee to evaluate the
performance o f completed peer reviews is in place and functioning. (This
applies to the private companies practice section (PCPS) as well, although the
PCPS is beyond the scope of this article.)
Recognizing that peer reviews, like audits, must be performed on a sampling
basis, a special investigations committee (SIC) has been added to the SECPS to
inquire into alleged audit failures charged by plaintiffs in litigation against any
member firm. Such inquiries are designed to be no more burdensome on the
member firm than necessary, but if circumstances suggest that there may be a
need for important remedial measures, investigation o f part or even all o f the
subject firm’s practice is likely to follow. In addition, at the completion of the
investigation, a recommendation o f sanctions, if considered necessary, will be
made to the section’s executive committee.
The SEC, charged by Congress with an oversight responsibility, interacts with
the section’s self-regulatory effort in a number o f ways. It discharges its assigned
responsibility in part by becoming familiar with and testing the work o f the
peer review committee, which constitutes the cornerstone o f the self-regulatory
program. It also seeks assurance that the SIC is performing satisfactorily and
that the POB’s oversight function is effective. To date, there has been no action
on the part o f the SEC that can be construed as a serious threat to the “se lf’’
designation o f the section’s regulatory process. At the same time, I must report
no lack o f interest or failure of diligence in the performance of the SEC’s
oversight function.

THE POB’S ROLE
The POB, four o f whose five members aren’t accountants, occupies an interesting
position in the total scheme, a position with multiple responsibilities. It represents
the public, meeting with various elements o f the self-regulatory program on a
recurring basis to remind them o f the public interest and the public viewpoint.
The POB has no line authority and desires none. From the beginning, it has
taken the position that, if the process is to be one of self-regulation, all authority
must be vested in members of the section. The POB can oversee, comment,
suggest and point out; it cannot order or demand. The POB sees as its purpose
the protection o f the section’s right to self-regulation. It can achieve that purpose
most effectively by reminding the SECPS executive committee o f how its decisions
may be viewed by the public. Here’s an example.
There is an understandable tendency on the part o f member firms to object
to any suggestion that technical membership rules be disregarded. They are
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quite within their legal rights in doing so. Some rules were specifically intended
to limit the scope o f members’ responsibility, for example, a cut-off date before
which the SIC wouldn’t be concerned with cases in litigation. The POB recognizes
this but on at least one occasion recommended a contrary point o f view. Relying
on technical rules, however legal, to avoid inquiries into alleged audit failures
may be regarded by the public as contrary to the spirit of self-regulation. If
there has been an audit failure, the section needs to know what it is, assess its
implications for future service and assure that any necessary remedial action is
taken.
Furthermore, the public is unlikely to favor technicalities that appear to
protect substandard practice at the expense of investors. The public isn’t likely
to be mollified with the statement, “Technically, the case can’t be inquired into.”
It asks, “Do the facts in any way imply that current standards of audit performance
are not being met?” and “Are the rules intended to protect the public or to aid
firms in evading standards?” The POB serves the cause of self-regulation by
pointing out the reasoning the public will apply.
The POB staff serves as a reviewer of peer review workpapers and the peer
review process in general. The POB also serves as a buffer and provides liaison
between the SEC and the section’s regulatory activities. In doing so, it must be
able to understand and empathize with both but sympathize with neither. On
some matters the views o f these two parties are remarkably similar; on other
matters they differ widely. The POB strives to explain each to the other and to
seek a working reconciliation wherever possible.

HOW GOOD IS PEER REVIEW?
Two questions have been asked often enough that they deserve comment:
1.
2.

Is peer review working?
As long as the profession has peer review, why does it need the SIC?

The two are closely linked. The first question is raised most frequently on
the basis o f reports o f litigation in the financial press alleging accounting or
audit failures. Why do these occur if peer review is effective?
There is no question in my mind that peer review is effective in improving
the general quality o f audits performed by firms subject to it. The POB receives
and reads copies o f all adverse and qualified opinions resulting from peer
reviews; we sit in on some exit conferences; our staff reports to the board on
letters o f comment to the managements of reviewed firms and on such
managements’ responses to those comments. We observe in the peer review
process an effectual and efficient combination of professional challenges and
response, both in the performance of the review and in the reaction to it. Those
cynics who see it as an exercise in mutual backscratching have no understanding
o f the effect o f peer criticism on proud and sensitive professionals in a highly
competitive activity.
If peer review is working so well, why is there so much litigation? The peer
review process is systems oriented. It is directed at the reviewed firm’s system
of quality control. Litigation concerns specific cases. No system can assure that
work performed by mortals will always be completely free of fault. Given the
total number o f audits required and the variety o f conditions, distractions,
pressures and personal problems faced by the auditors involved, some mistakes,
lapses o f judgment, oversights and misunderstandings are as inevitable as death
and taxes. Perfect audits in all circumstances and situations are as unlikely as
sustained perfection in any other human activity.
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DOES THE PROFESSION NEED AN SIC?
Allegations of audit failure sufficient to initiate litigation against accountants
may imply a weakness in a firm’s system of quality control. The fact that they
may imply such a weakness requires attention. The SIC is charged with the
responsibility o f ascertaining the probability o f substance in such charges. A
preliminary review is made of the allegations and the financial statements in
question to discover whether the charges have any apparent foundation in fact.
In some instances, this is enough to establish that they are groundless and the
case can be closed. In other cases, the preliminary review finds enough in the
allegations to warrant a discussion with the firm’s representatives and a review
o f recent peer review findings. In some instances, the circumstances are such
that the SIC must conclude that there is a possibility that a failure in the firm’s
system o f quality control occurred and that it could happen again.
If so, an investigation is undertaken. The purpose o f the investigation is to
protect the public, not to try the case. The specific case is already in litigation;
the court will determine the validity o f the plaintiff's allegations. But the court
will go no further. It is incumbent on the self-regulatory process to protect the
public against quality control breakdowns. If, and I emphasize the word if, the
firm’s quality control process has failed in a specific case, the process may also
have failed in other audits involving clients in the same industry or performed
by the same personnel. A credible self-regulatory program must ascertain
whether this is the fact and, if it is, take steps to see that the deficiency in the
firm’s system is remedied.
When the implications of an alleged audit failure are deemed sufficient to
threaten the public interest, the SIC investigates the firm’s system of quality
control in terms much more specific than contemplated in recurring peer review.
Peer review remains the cornerstone of the section’s self-regulatory process.
Yet, no matter how effective peer review is, there will always be instances of
alleged audit failure, and all of these raise questions about the firm’s quality
controls. The SECPS needs the SIC to ascertain whether the potential for harm
to the public exists and to demand remedial measures, if needed.

A LEARNING EXPERIENCE
For all concerned, this is a learning experience, an interesting, exciting and
difficult experience. Many of the things are being done for the first time, not
only by those doing them but for the first time by the profession. Unavoidably
that means there will be some unhappy people. No one wants to be investigated
or sanctioned. Neither does anyone in the process want to make the mistake o f
charging dereliction o f duty without adequate support for the charge.
An interesting question has been raised about the type of people who should
be appointed to the POB and to the SIC. Let me describe the current members
of these units as I have come to know them through direct observation. All
have carried important executive responsibilities; they are seasoned by long
experience. They possess excellent personal reputations for integrity, depend
ability and diligence, reputations that they are unwilling to see sullied in any
way. They are prudent, courageous, understanding and intent on getting the
facts. They have high standards of professional and public responsibility, are
aware of the pressures and temptations that beset mortal man, and on occasion
exhibit a strong sense o f moral outrage. None o f them is seeking to build a new
reputation; their ambitions have been fulfilled. They can be trusted to take
their public responsibilities seriously and to discharge them objectively.
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At the AICPA’s ninth national conference on current SEC developments in
1982, members of the POB were criticized as not being “movers and shakers.”
I expect that this is a fair description o f their present activities, however vigorous
their earlier careers may have been. I do not view such a description as pejorative
in any sense, although it may have been so intended. My experience with movers
and shakers is that they often leave a mess for someone else to clean up. Intent
on fame and glory, they stride through life straightening out the affairs o f lesser
men whether or not such attention is needed. It is a good thing that some
movers and shakers are part of the accounting profession. It is also a good
thing that they aren’t members of the POB or the SIC. One quakes at the mere
thought o f what a first-class mover and shaker could do in such a position.

SOME FUTURE PROSPECTS
So I would offer some suggestions. To those who criticize an apparent lack o f
exciting actions, I note that they may continue to be disappointed. The selfregulatory process works most effectively when it is not in the public press.
Don’t expect it to emulate public regulation; it should and does favor different
methods and different goals. It will always favor investigations and sanctions
directed at the improvement o f audit service over those directed at mere
punishment.
To those who object to the current self-regulatory process as too onerous,
one can only assert that self-regulation is, in fact, regulation. Society expects
more and more each year from those who have the good fortune to be regarded
and rewarded as professionals. Those who are now engaged in any way within
the accounting profession’s self-regulatory process are seriously endeavoring to
improve the quality o f professional practice without placing undue burdens on
anyone. They appreciate, enjoy and take pride in the quality o f their real world
practice. Those who fail to meet satisfactory standards in their professional
work will not be permitted to give the entire SECPS a bad reputation or to
expose the self-regulatory process to undesirable risk.
I can also offer some assurances. Reconciliation of opposing influences within
the section, and between the section and government, is no easy matter. Yet, it
is progressing. Peer review and special investigations are proceeding. Liaison
with the SEC is effective. The POB adds an essential public point o f view, does
not hesitate to make its views known and has been effective in causing
reconsideration o f decisions. Much has been done and there is much yet to do.
All engaged in this effort are entitled to take some pride in current accomplish
ments as long as they do not rest on that record. The real record o f self
regulation for accounting is yet to be made as the profession works its way
through this period of economic stress and strain. The hard decisions are yet
to come.
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appendix C

SECPS’S RESPONSE TO
THE REPORT’S CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS

AlC PA

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10036

(212) 575-62 00

September 27, 1984
Mr. B. Z. Lee, Chairman
Board of Directors
American Institute o f CPAs
1211 Avenue o f the Americas
New York, NY 10036
Dear Mr. Lee:
This letter is a progress report on the SEC Practice Section’s response to the
conclusions and recommendations in the June 1984 Report of the Special Committee
on the Review of the Structure and Operations of the SEC Practice Section (the “report”).
I am pleased to report that the SECPS Executive Committee has discussed
the recommendations in the report at length and, at its meeting on September
13, 1984, acted to implement measures that are responsive to a number o f those
recommendations. In addition, as indicated below, the committee dealt with
several recommendations by referring them to other groups within the division
for study and suggestions on the most effective manner in which to implement
them.
The following discussion is organized along the lines o f the overview o f the
principal findings contained in Chapter 2 of the report.

PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE SECTION
The SECPS agrees that there should be increased public awareness o f the section
and the beneficial effects o f its efforts, and that the public’s understanding of
the concept o f self-regulation in the accounting profession should be enhanced.
Accordingly, the SECPS and the Private Companies Practice Section, acting
together, have engaged a well-known public relations firm to assist in a broad
public information program which will be targeted at local, regional and national
audiences. The initial program will stress the qualitative improvements in the
practice o f public accounting derived from the activities o f the Division for CPA
Firms. The program begins this fall and will extend over a twelve- to eighteenmonth period. The results of the program will be monitored to determine its
effectiveness in broadening the public’s understanding o f the Division for CPA
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Firms and its quest for professional excellence through peer review and
continuing education.
The Executive Committee will ask public relations counsel to assist it in
considering the various vehicles that could be used to provide information to
the public on the scope and results of the peer review program and the special
investigative process. In this connection, the Executive Committee must consider
the role o f the Public Oversight Board in reporting to the public and whether
and how this role would be affected by the issuance of periodic reports by the
section itself. The Executive Committee believes that it is essential that the
POB’s reports retain their unique importance to the public and will consult with
the POB before implementing specific steps to deal with this recommendation.
The section is continuing its consideration o f various vehicles responsive to the
recommendation.

INITIATIVES BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Representatives of SECPS member firms that have the privilege of serving on
the section’s Executive Committee are aware of the associated responsibility.
The Executive Committee is committed to providing the SECPS with the
guidance and leadership necessary to achieve its objective of improving the
quality o f practice by member firms in a voluntary organization. The recom
mendation in the report concerning Executive Committee representation is a
helpful reminder in this regard.
The report suggests initiatives the Executive Committee might take to improve
communications, develop new programs to enhance the benefits of membership,
and clarify the conditions under which it would impose sanctions.
At the last three meetings of the Executive Committee, the chairman o f the
Peer Review Committee has presented expanded, detailed reports on peer
review activity and special situations encountered in the process. The chairman
or another representative o f the Special Investigations Committee will attend
Executive Committee meetings at least semiannually to report directly on SIC
activities and developments.
To improve communications with members and nonmembers, the report
suggests that the section hold annual meetings of member firms as technical
and professional forums on SEC practice matters and that the section publish
a quarterly newsletter for its members. The Private Companies Practice Section
currently holds its own annual conference and publishes a quarterly newsletter.
A Joint Coordinating Committee o f the Division has been formed and will,
among other things, consider how to implement this recommendation for
improved communications and at the same time avoid unnecessary duplication
and overlap that could be created if each section acts separately.
The Executive Committee has approved a Statement of Policy on the
Imposition o f Sanctions, which is consistent with the views in the report; it will
be published as an appendix to the SECPS Organizational Structure and
Functions document in the SECPS Manual.

PEER REVIEW PROGRAM
The Executive Committee is pleased with the assessment in the report that the
peer review program is an effective and beneficial mechanism for enhancing
the quality o f the accounting and audit practice of SECPS member firms. The
Peer Review Committee continuously evaluates the program to ensure that it
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operates as efficiently as possible without reducing its effectiveness in achieving
the section’s objectives. The Executive Committee is committed to the peer
review process and agrees that the three-year interval for peer reviews remains
appropriate at the present time.
The report suggests that the section adopt more specific requirements relating
to the evaluation in peer review of the effectiveness of a firm’s second-partner
review program. The Executive Committee has approved a revision of its
existing guidance entitled Scope of Concurring Review so that both member firms
and peer reviewers have a better understanding of what is expected from firms
with respect to this membership requirement relating to SEC engagements. The
Peer Review Committee will consider whether additional guidance is needed in
the peer review compliance checklists.

INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS
As indicated in the report, the activities of the Special Investigations Committee
complement the peer review process and function effectively to improve the
quality o f member firms’ auditing practices. However, the report recommends
steps be taken
•
•
•
•

Clarify the scope o f the committee’s authority and its mode o f operation.
Disseminate more information about its activities.
Expand the scope of the cases that member firms are required to report.
Achieve more equitable and consistent treatments o f the cost o f special
peer reviews.

The Executive Committee has approved a revised organizational document
for the Special Investigations Committee. The revision more accurately describes
the committee’s objectives, procedures and its authority; the revised document
is consistent with the views expressed in the report. It will be published as an
integral part of the SECPS Manual.
The Executive Committee recognizes that there has been little public infor
mation about the activities of the Special Investigations Committee, because of
the confidentiality surrounding the committee’s work, and that this circumstance
increases the difficulty o f obtaining full public acceptance. Confidentiality with
respect to specific cases must be maintained, as noted in the report, in order
for an investigative process to function effectively within a voluntary organization.
However, the Executive Committee agrees that additional information about
remedial and corrective measures resulting from the process could enhance the
public’s confidence in the section’s self-regulatory programs.
Expanded disclosure o f information relating to the investigative process is
provided in the Public Oversight Board’s annual report for the year ended June
30, 1984. How and when such information should be disclosed in the future is
one o f the matters that the Executive Committee will be working with public
relations counsel to resolve, in consultation with the POB.
The report also recommends that the section make available in a manner
appropriate for educational purposes information about unusual or recurring
problems encountered in the investigative process. The Executive Committee
has asked a task force to consider how to implement this recommendation in a
manner that has truly educational benefit for the profession and the public
while retaining the confidentiality necessary to insure the success o f the
investigative process.
The report recommends that the section’s membership requirement for
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reporting cases to the Special Investigations Committee be expanded to cover
cases involving all entities in which there is a significant public interest. The
Executive Committee has asked a task force to undertake an in-depth study of
this recommendation.
The Executive Committee agrees with the recommendation that the cost of
a special peer review o f a firm conducted at the direction o f the Special
Investigations Committee should be borne by the firm involved without regard
to the type o f reviewing body. This recommendation is included in the revised
organizational document for the Special Investigations Committee referred to
earlier.

COORDINATION WITH THE PRIVATE COMPANIES
PRACTICE SECTION
As recommended in the report, the Executive Committees o f both the SECPS
and the PCPS have appointed representatives to a Joint Coordinating Committee.
That committee has already met three times. Its initial priority is implementation
o f the public information program referred to earlier.
The efforts of the Special Committees have resulted in many constructive and
valuable recommendations. They should increase the effectiveness o f the
programs undertaken by the SEC Practice Section to improve the quality of
practice by CPA firms before the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
section remains committed to that objective.
Sincerely,

John W. Zick, Chairman
SECPS Executive Committee
JWZ:cw
cc: SECPS Executive Committee
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